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DECEPTIVE POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES: HOW FAR IS TOO FAR?
Laurie Magid*

I.

INTRODUCTION: FOCUSING ON VOLUNTARINESS
TO L IMIT THE USE OF DECEPTION

Virtually all interrogations - or at least virtually all successful in
terrogations - involve some deception.1 As the United States
Supreme Court has placed few limits on the use of deception, the vari
ety of deceptive techniques is limited chiefly by the ingenuity of the
interrogator. Interrogators still rely on the classic "Mutt and Jeff," or
"good cop, bad cop," routine. Interrogators tell suspects that non
existent eyewitnesses have identified them, or that still at-large ac
complices have given statements against them. Interrogators have
been known to put an unsophisticated suspect's hand on a fancy, new
photocopy machine and tell him that the "Truth Machine" will know if
he is lying. Occasionally, an interrogator will create a piece of evi
dence, such as a lab report purporting to link the suspect's bodily flu
ids to the victim. Perhaps most often, interrogators lie to create a rap
port with a suspect. Interrogators who feel utter revulsion toward
suspects accused of horrible crimes sometimes speak in a kindly, solici
tous tone, professing to feel sympathy and compassion for the suspect
and to feel that the victim, even if a child, should share the blame. At
the very least, the successful interrogator deceives the suspect by al
lowing the suspect to believe that it somehow will be in the suspect's
best interest to undertake the almost always self-defeating course of
confessing.

*
Special Assistant District Attorney, Delaware County, PA; Commissioner,
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing; Lecturer, Villanova Law School. B.S. 1982,
Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1985, Columbia Law School.
In writing this Article, I benefited greatly from discussing drafts with Benjamin
Abelow, Paul Cassell, Marianne Cox, Diane Edelman, Karen Grigsby, Lori Klein, Richard
Leo, Laura Little, Paul Marcus, Joseph McGettigan, Geoffrey Moulton, Margaret Raymond,
Louis Sirico, and Welsh White. My research assistants, Timothy Bowers, Ipek Kurul,
Bernadette Sparling, and Theresa Vitello, were enormously helpful in researching this
Article.

1. As referred to by commentators seeking to limit the use of deceptive interrogation
techniques, deception is defined broadly to include everything from express misstatements
about the existence of evidence, to the use of false expressions of sympathy for a suspect in
order to establish a better rapport.
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Because most deception is employed only after the suspect exe
cutes a valid waiver of Miranda2 rights, Miranda offers suspects little
protection from deceptive interrogation techniques. Thus, commenta
tors have increasingly looked to the volllntariness requirement of the
Due Process Clause as a basis for limiting these techniques. These
commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the voluntari
ness requirement - such as equality, dignity, and trust - to justify
limiting the use of deception. On close scrutiny, however, none of
these rationales provides a sound basis for prohibiting or drastically
limiting the use of deception during interrogation. Presumably in rec
ognition of the fact that these rationales have somewhat limited reso
nance with the Court, with legislators, and with the public at large,
some commentators have now focused on the reliability rationale for
the voluntariness requirement. A confession is unreliable when the
person who gives it actually had nothing to do with the crime to which
he purports to confess.
Commentators have sought to show that deception causes many
false confessions and, thus, the wrongful convictions of many innocent
persons.3 Their efforts have captured the attention not only of the
academic community, but also of the popular press.4 Television, news
papers, and magazines have reported on individual cases in which de
fendants were convicted after giving purportedly false confessions,5
and on the academic studies calling for limits on the use of deception
during interrogation.6 Scholars of law and psychology have made sug2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. As discussed in this literature, a false confession does not include a statement making
even a partial admission to actual wrongdoing. A false confession consists only of an admis 
sion to wrongdoing by an entirely innocent person.
4. See Alan W. Scheflin, Book Review, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1998)
(reviewing CRIMINAL DETECTION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME (David W. Canter &
Laurence J. Alison, eds., 1997)) (finding that the "field of false confessions is currently a
'hot' topic").
5. See James R. Peterson, True Confession?, PLAYBOY, July 1, 1999, at 45, available at
1999 WL 7387978 (collecting cases of allegedly false confessions); ABC News: 20120 (ABC
television broadcast, June 18, 1999), available at 1999 WL 6790763 (reporting on the confes 
sion of twelve-year-old Anthony Harris to murdering his five-year-old neighbor, and the
confession of fifteen-year-old Michael Crowe to murdering his younger sister); CBS News:
48 Hours (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 13, 2000) , available at 2000 WL 8422806 (reporting
on two teenagers who confessed to murdering four girls in Austin) [hereinafter 48 Hours]; 60
Minutes (CBS television broadcast, June 30, 1996) (reporting on the case of Richard
LaPointe's allegedly false confession to murder).
6. See, e.g. , Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have
Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at A l (reporting on Leo and Ofshe's study); Thomas
H. Maugh II, Glendale Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1998, at A l (same); Mary McCarty & Tom Beyerlein, Coming Back to Life After Hell,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 4, 1985, at lA, available at 1995 WL 8952484 (reporting on man
released from death row and referring to the Bedau & Radelet study); Clarence Page, When
a Death Sentence is Dead Wrong, CINCINNATI POST, July 11, 1996, at 19A, available at 1996
WL 10557685 (reporting on four men freed from prison and the report by Bedau and
Radelet); Peterson, supra note 5, at 45 (reporting on Leo and Ofshe study of sixty false con -
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gestions for curtailing deceptive interrogation techniques.7 While some
commentators have concluded that few limits on deception techniques
are necessary,8 and a few have advocated prohibiting any interrogation
techniques involving deception,9 still others have proposed limits be
tween these two extremes. 10
fessions); 48 Hours, supra note 5 (reporting that Dr. Ofshe has analyzed sixty cases of police
induced false confessions).

7. See Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief
Comment on Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1123, 1131 (1997) ("In the law
reviews and psychological journals, one can read a veritable stream of new ideas for re
stricting - or even eliminating - police interrogation.") [hereinafter Cassell, Balanced
Approaches].
8. See, e.g. , Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 16, 20 (1961) ("Although both 'fair'and 'unfair' interrogation practices are
permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the subject that will be apt to make an innocent
person confess.") [hereinafter Inbau, Police Interrogation]; Christopher Slobogin, Deceit,
Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 777 (1997) (taking
a fairly expansive view on the use of deception by asserting that deceptive practices should
be permitted once there has been a judicial determination of probable cause); Joseph D .
Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern
Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 690 (1986) (reviewing FRED E. INBAU ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1 986)) (concluding that "tactics that
are likely to induce a false confession" are unacceptable) [hereinafter Grano, Selling the
Idea].
9. See Margaret Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 3, 9, 44
(1996) (advocating the prohibition of any lies during questioning) [hereinafter Paris, Trust];
Daniel W. Sasaki, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and Confessions, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1593, 1612 (1988) (advocating a per se rule against police trickery during interroga
tion); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV.
425, 477 (1996) (urging a complete ban on police lying in order to maintain trust relation
ships between citizens and the police); Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True Blue?
Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1994).
Some commentators have sought to limit not only deceptive interrogation, but also any
interrogation of suspects in the absence of counsel. See Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L.
Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV.
69 (1989); see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT xvii (1932) (pro
posing a bar on all interrogation by the police); Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police
Interrogation - And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 726 (1988) (arguing for a bar on all confessions obtained during custo
dial interrogation); Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A
Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 1842 (1987) (urging that interro
gation be permitted only in the presence of counsel); Young, supra at 473-76 (arguing that
confessions are seldom necessary, especially if obtained by deception).
10. The most detailed intermediate proposal comes from Professor Welsh White. He
argues "that interrogation methods likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions should be
prohibited." Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111 (1997) [hereinafter White,
False Confessions]. He advocates substantial limits on deception by proposing, first, that the
police be prohibited from falsely leading a suspect "into believing that forensic evidence es
tablishes his guilt," id. at 149, and, second, that courts closely scrutinize tactics that mislead
the suspect "as to the strength of the evidence against him (or the likelihood of his guilt),"
id. See also id. at 142-43 (suggesting that courts should restrict interrogation of "vulnerable
suspects" such as juveniles and mentally impaired persons). This two-part proposal is far
more limited than his 1979 proposal, in which he contended that "the device of seeking to
elicit incriminating information through the assumption of a non-adversarial role should be
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In order to evaluate these calls for either bans or significant limits
on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques, I begin by briefly
summarizing the history of the voluntariness requirement to identify
its primary policy of preventing unreliable confessions. Next, I critique
the rationales for the voluntariness requirement, other than reliability,
that have been offered as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation.
After concluding that none of these other rationales offers an appro
priate basis for the limits, I examine the reliability rationale for the
voluntariness requirement, and I find that it does provide the appro
priate basis for setting appropriate limits on deceptive interrogation
techniques. I then consider the evidence that reliability has been im
plicated by the purportedly widespread problem with police-induced
false confessions. Finding that the evidence of such false confessions
consists entirely of anecdotal accounts, I conclude that the existing
evidence falls well short of establishing the significant problem that

barred." Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 581,
617 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery).
Professor Albert Alschuler has made suggestions similar to those of Professor White. He
acknowledges that "[i]n some circumstances, [the police) should be allowed to express false
sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, play on the suspect's religious feelings, reveal
incriminating evidence that in fact exists, confront the suspect with inconsistent statements,
and more." Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 957, 973
(1997) [hereinafter Alschuler, Constraint]; see also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2669 (1996)
(proposing that police interrogation be replaced with questioning by a neutral magistrate).
But he insists that, in addition to barring threats or promises, courts "should forbid falsifying
incriminating evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect."
Alschuler, Constraint, supra at 974.
Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, the authors of a widely-cited article on false
confessions, suggest a different approach. They do not advocate direct limits on the use of
interrogation techniques involving deception. Instead, they first suggest that interrogations
be videotaped. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U . L. REV. 979, 1 120 (1997) ("To further
improve interrogation practices and the truth-finding function of the criminal justice system,
mandatory taping of interrogations should be adopted.") [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Decision
to Confess Falsely]. They then suggest that judges evaluate the reliability of a confession be
fore admitting it as evidence at trial. See id. at 1118. They would have judges determine reli
ability by considering whether the defendant's "post-confession narrative" and the other
evidence in the case corroborate the confession. Such evaluations are objectionable, how
ever, because they would intrude on the traditional role of the factfinder. Judges do not
evaluate other types of evidence - such as witness identifications - to determine whether
the evidence is corroborated by other evidence. There is no reason to impose a corrobora
tion requirement on statement evidence. See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent":
An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction From False Confessions, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'
Y 523, 526 (1999) (criticizing the corroboration requirement)
[hereinafter Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent"). Even if the use of deception were shown to cre
ate a false confession problem, the proposed pre-trial evaluation of all confessions would not
be the appropriate means of remedying the problem. See Welsh S. White, What is an
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2025-26 (1998) (criticizing Leo's
reliability requirement as both unworkable and insufficiently protective) [hereinafter White, .
Involuntary Confession].
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has been alleged to exist.1 1 On the other hand, greatly limiting decep
tion would impose significant costs on society in terms of reduced
numbers of true confessions and reduced convictions of guilty persons.
There is absolutely no question that the conviction of an innocent
person because of a false confession is an enormous failing of the
criminal justice system. But it does matter whether such occurrences
are rare tragedies or a widespread epidemic. Statistically sound stud
ies, based on a random sample of confessions to determine how many
are false, can and should be done. At this point, however, given the
absence of empirical support, the calls for fundamentally changing the
way crime is investigated in this country are not justified.
II.
A.

DEFINING VOLUNTARINESS

The Multi-Factor Totality of the Circumstances Test

The common law originally placed no limits on the methods used
to obtain confessions.12 During the 1700s and 1800s, however, judges in
both Great Britain and the United States became increasingly con
cerned about the reliability of statements obtained by physically abu
sive means and began to ask whether confessions were voluntarily
given.13 For example, in its 1884 Hopt v. Utah decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court suggested that abusive interrogation tactics might re
but "the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions),
namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or preju
dice his interests by an untrue statement."14
Nevertheless, law enforcement personnel continued to employ the
"third degree" during interrogation. In 1 936, however, with Brown v.
Mississippi,15 the Court turned to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for examining the voluntariness
of confessions in dozens of state cases.16 The Court held that police use
of violence was "revolting to the sense of justice,"17 stating that " [t)he
1 1 . Thus far, there has been "advocacy research," but not objective "academic re
search," on the issue of how frequently false confessions occur. See generally Victor L.
Streib, Academic Research and Advocacy Research, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253 (1988).
12. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at 442 (2d ed. 1999).

See id. § 6.2, at 440 ("[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or
by the torture of fear" would be excluded because it "comes in so questionable a shape when
it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given 'to it." (quoting
The King v. Warickshall, 1 68 Eng. Rep. 234, 234-35 (K.B. 1783))).
13.

14. 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884).
1 5 . 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936).
16. See Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2203
("Due Process doctrine for police interrogations began its life with the Court's dramatic
creation of a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule in Brown v. Mississippi . . . . ").
17. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
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rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness
stand."18 In Brown and other early cases, the Court clearly believed
that innocent persons had been convicted, and that their confessions
were unreliable.19 Due process required interrogation procedures that
would yield voluntary, and therefore reliable, statements. Courts used
a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine whether "the
interrogation was . . . unreasonable or shocking, or if the accused
clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational or intelligent
choice. "20
The totality of the circumstances test required courts to consider:
the conduct and actions of the officers; the physical surroundings of
the interrogation; and the characteristics and status of the defendant,
including both physical and mental condition.21 Some types of police
conduct were deemed so coercive that no examination of the particu
lar susceptibilities of the suspect was even necessary.22 Most notably,
physical violence and threats, whether implicit23 or explicit, could not
be directed against any suspect.24 Physical mistreatment,25 such as ex
tended periods of interrogation without intervals for sleep, also pro
vided grounds for finding involuntariness.26
The Court's pre-Miranda cases regularly looked to the characteris
tics of the particular defendant in deciding whether a confession
should be deemed involuntary.27 When the suspect was a juvenile,
mentally ill, retarded, or intoxicated, courts required the police to
lessen the intensity and duration of the interrogation or reduce the
amount of deception. In other cases, however, the courts provided lit18. Id. at 285-86.
19. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (defendant threatened with mob vio
lence); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (defendant interrogated for five days with
no contact with anyone except the police); White v. Texas, 309 U.S. 631 (1940) (defendant
taken into the woods on six nights for interrogation).
20. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 661 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dis
senting).
21. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2(c), at 448.
22. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953) (stating that, when the police con
duct is outrageous, "there is no need to weigh or measure its effects on the will of the indi
vidual victim").
23. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (defendant was kept naked for three
hours, then left in his socks and underwear with a blanket for several more hours).
24. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 (1963) (slapping); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (whipping).
25. See, e.g., Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1961) (deprivation of food or water).
26. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)
(thirty-six hours of interrogation).
27. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (stating, in a case in which a fifteen
year-old African-American defendant was arrested for murder and questioned from mid
night to 5:00 a.m. by relays of officers, "[t]hat which would leave a man cold and unim
pressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.").
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tle guidance to police regarding which social, emotional, or mental
characteristics were relevant in determining how to interrogate a par
ticular suspect.28
Even though reliability was surely uppermost in the Court's mind
when it decided Brown v. Mississippi, the Court gave mixed and con
fusing signals in subsequent cases about the precise rationale for the
voluntariness requirement.29 For example, in Jackson v. Denno,30 the
Court referred to a "complex of values" requiring the exclusion of in
voluntary confessions. Reliability was just one of these values. Yet,
notwithstanding the Court's assertions that there are rationales other
than reliability for the voluntariness requirement, reliability still ap
pears to be the single most important factor considered by the Court
in deciding whether a confession is voluntary.31
B.

Courts Place Few Limits on the Use of Deception
During an Interrogation

Interrogation typically requires at least some deception - from
professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the
strength of the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a
witness has identified the suspect.32 In the pre-Miranda voluntariness
28. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), the Court found that police miscon
duct was an absolute prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness. Thus, the vulnerabilities of
a particular defendant could never alone establish involuntariness.
29. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 112-13 (discussing Rogers v.
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1 961)). In Rogers, the Court said that the issue was not reliability
but "whether the behavior of the State's Jaw enforcement officials was such as to overbear
[defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined - a ques
tion to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [defendant] in fact spoke the
truth." Rogers, 365 U.S. at 542, 544.
30. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
31. See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND POLICY 20-21 (1980) (during the 1960s, "in 99 cases out of 100," a confession's volun
tariness would be determined on the basis of whether the " interrogation methods em
ployed . . . create[d] a substantial risk that a person subjected to them will falsely confess whether or not this particular defendant did." (emphasis omitted)); White, False Confes
sions, supra note 10, at 1 13 ("[I]t still appeared that the probable trustworthiness of a confes
sion would be an important factor in determining its admissibility under the due process vol
untariness test.").
32. The seminal work on the various types of deception that the police employ during
interrogation is contained in the police manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986).
In Professor Leo's "typology of interrogatory deception," he catalogues the most fre
quently used interrogation techniques. See Richard A. Leo & Jerome H. Skolnick, The Eth
ics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5-7 (1992). He included: (1) pre
senting interrogations as noncustodial interviews not subject to Miranda; (2) giving the
Miranda warnings in a way calculated to downplay their importance; (3) misrepresenting the
nature or seriousness of the offense; (4) assuming roles to make manipulative appeals io
conscience; (5) misrepresenting the moral seriousness of the offense; (6) using vague and
indefinite promises; (7) misrepresenting police identity; and (8) fabricating evidence.
Professor Leo's description of deceptive tactics is quite similar to that of the Miranda Court.
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cases, the Court characterized the use of deception during interroga
tion as just one of the many factors it considered in evaluating the to
tality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. For example, in
Spano v. New York,33 an officer, who was also a close friend of the de
fendant, told the defendant that he would get in a lot of trouble if the
defendant did not confess. The Court found that the use of the defen
dant's childhood friend, who feigned legal and family difficulties to get
the defendant to confess, was unconstitutional. Although the Court
held that the defendant's statement was involuntary, the use of decep
tion was not a dispositive factor.34 In addition to the exploitation of the
friendship, the Court's holding relied on the defendant's limited edu
cation, his emotional instability, his great fatigue, the pressure used by
the interrogating officers over many hours, his requests for an attor
ney, and his requests to remain silent.35
Although the Miranda Court appeared to take a negative view of
deceptive interrogation techniques, the Court imposed few limits on
their use. By detailed reference to police training manuals, the Court
took note of widely used techniques, such as "good cop, bad cop" rou
tines and false lineup identification techniques, and observed that the
techniques created or increased the disadvantage most suspects had in
matching wits with their interrogators.36 Instead of forbidding such
techniques, however, the Court protected suspects by requiring that
police inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and to be pro
vided with an attorney before commencing custodial interrogation.37
Miranda was the high-water mark of the Court's negative view of in
terrogation in general and deceptive interrogation in particular.38 Since

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962) (cataloguing various psy
chological interrogation techniques)); see also White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 60228 (describing various types of deception used by police during interrogation).
33. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
34. The Court stated that it deserved mentioning, in the totality of the circumstances
inquiry, that one of the officers who questioned the defendant was a childhood friend, who
falsely represented to the defendant that he would be in trouble if the defendant did not con
fess. Id. at 323.
35. See id. at 321-23 (noting that the cumulation of these factors amounted to "official
pressure" that overwhelmed the defendant's will).
36. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-58 (listing various types of police deception and ob
serving that they could take a "heavy toll on individual liberty").
37. Miranda does limit the use of deception in obtaining a waiver of rights or in re
sponding to requests to invoke the rights. Once the police obtain a valid waiver, however,
and absent any express invocations of the right to silence or counsel, Miranda leaves the po
lice free to use almost any deceptive tactic.
38. When the Court recently reaffirmed the Miranda procedures, in Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), the Court did not reaffirm the Miranda Court's arguably nega
tive view of confessions. Where the Miranda decision is full of great passion and rhetoric,
much of it aimed at the most common interrogation procedures, the Dickerson opinion is
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then, the Court's decisions have reflected a far more positive attitude
toward police interrogation and the role of confessions in the criminal
j ustice system.
The Court has directly considered the propriety of deception only
once. In Frazier v. Cupp,39 the police misrepresented the strength of
their case against the defendant. They falsely told the defendant that
his cousin, who had been with him on the night of the crime, had con
fessed.40 The Court considered the fact of this deception relevant to,
but not dispositive of, the voluntariness issue. The Court has repeat
edly declined the opportunity to place any specific limits on the use of
deception during interrogation.41
In 1986, while considering lies made to an attorney, the Court, in
Moran v. Burbine, did acknowledge that some police deception might
be so "egregious" that it could rise to the "level of a due process viola
tion."42 Yet the Court neither provided examples of such unacceptable
police conduct, nor suggested that the police needed to be particularly
careful about using deception during interrogation. Instead, the
Moran Court emphasized that society has a "legitimate and substantial
interest in securing admissions of guilt,"43 and that " 'the need for po
lice questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws'
cannot be doubted."44 Similarly, in Illinois v. Perkins,45 the Court
spare and subdued. Looking primarily to the principle of stare decisis to reaffirm Miranda,
Chief Justice Rehnquist includes no criticism of specific police techniques.
39. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
40. Id. at 737. The police also falsely claimed to have sympathy for the defendant. See id.
at 738.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1017 (1990); People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881
(1990); State v. Register, 476 S.E.2d 153 (S.C. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1 129 (1997); State
v. Milburn, 511 S.E.2d 828 (W. Va. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 832 (1999). Moreover, in
several cases that the Court heard on other issues, deception had been used during interro
gation, and the Court made no unfavorable comment about the deception. See, e.g. , Illinois
v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 298 (1990) (holding that undercover officer posing as defendant's
fellow inmate was not required to give Miranda warnings); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195, 198, 203 (1989) (affirming conviction where police told defendant that they had no way
of giving him a lawyer, but that one could be appointed for him when he went to court);
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (holding that the police need not disclose all
possible areas of questioning before an interrogation); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492,
493-96 (1977) (per curiam) (finding that the police falsely told the defendant that they had
found his fingerprints at the scene, but deeming the falsehood irrelevant for Miranda pur
poses); Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)
(confessing suspect had been told that another person had named him as the gunman).
42. 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986).
43. Id. at 427.
44. Id. at 426 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)). The Court
has recognized that "[a]dmissions of guilt are more than merely 'desirable,' they are essential
to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law." Id. at 426 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186 (1977)); see also
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 1 71, 181 (1991) ("[T]he ready ability to obtain uncoerced con
fessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good . . . . ).
"
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noted that "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic decep
tion. . . . Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of se
curity that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak
are not within Miranda's concems."46 Thus, the "current constitutional
doctrine ... by and large, has acquiesced in, if not affirmatively sanc
tioned, police deception during the investigative phase. "47 The lower
federal courts and state courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's
decisions to find that almost no type of deception renders a confession
per se involuntary.48
C.

Court's Rationales for the Voluntariness Requirement

Although the Court has never set forth the precise rationale for
the voluntariness requirement,49 the reliability concern provides the
45. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
46. Id. at 297.
47. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 777; see also Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR.
L. REV. 817, 818 ("(C]onstitutional law permits courts little room to impose meaningful re
strictions on police lying . . . . ") (hereinafter Paris, Lying]; Paris', Trust, supra note 9, at 6
("[A]lthough interrogation in the United States is replete with formal rules and powerful
informal customs, it is remarkably unconstrained by strong rules prohibiting interrogators
from obtaining confessions by lies or trickery.").
48. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 781 ("The message to the police is that, as far as the law is
concerned, they have virtual carte blanche to engage in deceptive undercover work.");
Young, supra note 9, at 451 ("With no absolute prohibition of police lying during interroga
tion, courts today are free to condone such lying.").
Courts are tolerant of lies about the existence of evidence. See, e.g. , Arthur v.
Commonwealth, 480 S.E.2d 749, 752 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that defendant's confes
sion was voluntary, even though the police fabricated fingerprint and DNA reports). But see
State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the police could not
fabricate a lab report linking the suspect to the victim). The police may also lie about the
strength of the government's case, see id. § 6.9(c), at 587-90 (citing cases); Holland v.
McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051-52 (7th Cir. 1992) (police told the defendant a witness saw
him with the rape victim); United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1087-89 (3d Cir. 1 989)
(police told the defendant that her accomplice had given a statement against her); United
States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 460-61 (8th Cir. 1988) (police told defendant that the codefen
dant had confessed); Commonwealth v. Jones, 322 A.2d 1 19, 126 (Pa. 1974) (police told the
suspect that the co-defendant had given a statement against him); State v. Galli, 967 P.2d
930, 936 (Utah 1998) (police told the defendant that his co-defendants had implicated him in
robberies); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2, at 447 (collecting cases). Courts look with
somewhat more disfavor on lies about the law that will apply to defendant. See LAFAVE ET
AL., supra, § 6.2, at 447.
49. In some instances, the Court has resorted to vague language such as whether a de
fendant's "will was overborne" during interrogation. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680, 685 (1993) (considering claim that repeated promises of lenient treatment had over
borne defendant's will); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (concluding that
threat of physical violence had overborne defendant's will); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292,
303 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 325 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973) (listing factors courts
consider in determining if "a defendant's will was overborne"). The Court has also referred
to an individual's "autonomy" and "dignity" as concerns implicated by the voluntariness re
quirement. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 703 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Allen v. Illinois, 478
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most consistent, and appropriate, explanation for the Court's volun
tariness decisions.50 The reliability rationale requires the Court to con
sider whether the procedure by which a confession was obtained pro
duces an unacceptably high risk that even an innocent person would
confess to a crime if that procedure were used.51 State court decisions,
perhaps even more than the Court's own decisions, have focused on
the reliability rationale for the voluntariness inquiry.52 The Court's
rhetoric in some cases does suggest that there is certain conduct that
will not be tolerated as fair and just in a civilized society, even if it may
result in reliable confessions.53 Yet, in most instances, the best predic
tor of what will be deemed unacceptable is still the reliability princi
ple. Although a particular confession may be reliable in fact, interro
gation practices used to obtain that confession may be deemed
unacceptable because there is a significant likelihood that the practices
could produce unreliable confessions in other cases. Thus, the general

U.S. 364, 383 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983)
(Brennan J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 423 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dis
senting).
50. Reliability was certainly a concern of the Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936), where the conviction was based solely on confessions procured by brutal whippings.
In its post-Brown cases, the Court has, on a number of occasions, referred to the reliability
concern. See, e.g. , Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 ( 1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547
(1942) (stating that the police actions made the defendant "willing to make any statement
that the officers wanted him to make"); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940) (excluding
confession obtained after a Texas Ranger repeatedly took defendant into the woods at night
and whipped him); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
51. In considering the reliability rationale for the due process voluntariness require
ment, a court does not ask whether a confession should be deemed reliable given all of the
evidence in the case, other than the confession. Instead, a court must ask whether a govern
ment procedure, such as the use of a particular form of deception, generally creates an un
due risk that an innocent person will falsely confess. See White, Involuntary Confession, su
pra note 10, at 2022 ("[T)he Court's Due Process confession cases have always focused on
the propriety of the officers' interrogation methods rather than the resulting confessions.").
52. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2, at 456-59.
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (stating that confessions ob
tained through coercion are contrary to "the 'strongly felt attitude of our society that impor
tant human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government . . . wrings a confession
out of an accused against his will'" (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07
(1960))). The Court has appeared to characterize some police methods, conduct, or behav
ior, as so offensive or improper, that they are barred even if the reliability of the resulting
confession does not appear to be in question. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-55
(1949) (involving a series of lengthy interrogations that occurred over seven days); Haley v.
Ohio; 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-56 (1944) (involving 36
hours of continuous questioning). The Court has called various police methods unfair, see,
e.g. , Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219-236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of due pro
cess is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in
the use of evidence . . . . ); outrageous, illegal, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320
(1959) (confessions are excluded as involuntary because of "the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law"); or contrary to fundamental values, see
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) ("Coerced confessions offend the commu
nity's sense of fair play and decency.").
"
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statements about which police behavior will not be tolerated in a fair
system, often still reflect, at bottom, a concern with reliability.54
Ill. PROPOSED R EASONS, BEYOND RELIABILITY,
FOR L IMITING DECEPTION

Some of the proposed limits on deceptive interrogation are based
on rationales for the voluntariness requirement other than reliability.
To evaluate the worth of the proposed limits, it is necessary to con
sider the asserted rationales.
A. Equality Between Suspect and Interrogator:
"Fox-Hunter" Rationale
The "fox-hunter,'' "fair chance,'' or "sporting theory" rationale for
limiting police deception during interrogation provides that deception
gives the interrogator so much of an advantage that the suspect has no
real chance to avoid confessing.55 The argument is that the suspect is
entitled to some assistance in resisting the powerfully persuasive ap
peals of the interrogator to confess. The notion of creating some parity
between the suspect and his interrogator was evident in Miranda's
treatment of suspects as victims.56 References to the sporting theory
54. In his seminal 1963 article on the Court's involuntary confession cases, Professor
Yale Kamisar described the cases as decided based on two reliability standards. The first
standard considered whether the confession of the particular defendant, given that defen
dant's individual characteristics, might be unreliable. The second standard considers whether
the police tactic might make some innocent defendant confess, even if there was no concern
about the reliability of the instant confession. See Yale Kamisar, What Is an
Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and
Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 755 (1963). A tactic that would never cause an inno
cent person to confess falsely will rarely be deemed by the Court so outrageous as to be con
stitutionally barred.
55. Under this theory:
The fox is to have a fair chance for his life: he must have (so close is the analogy) what is
called law: leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a
chance for escape. While under pursuit, he must not be shot: it would be as unfair as con
victing him of burglary on a hen-roost, in five minutes' time, in a court of conscience.
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 29 (1993) (hereinafter
GRANO, CONFESSIONS] (citing J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, bk. 9, pt.
4, ch. 3 at 238-39 (1827)). "Bentham sarcastically observed
that this concern about the ac
°
cused's likelihood of success at trial can be rational only under a sporting code that has
amusement rather than justice at its end." Id; see also William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination
and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1234 n.22 (1988).
56. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (acknowledging historically unjust
methods for interrogating suspects); Joseph D. Grano, Criminal Procedure: Moving From
the Accused as Victim to the Accused as Responsible Party, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 711,
713 (1996) ("Miranda . . . expressed concern about the inequality between sophisticated and
unsophisticated defendants . . . . ") (hereinafter Grano, Criminal Procedure]; see also Andrew
L. Frey, Modern Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 731,
733-34 (1981) (stating that defendant, because of reliable confession, has no chance of ac
quittal is "wholly desirable").
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are even more pronounced, however, in the work of commentators
critical of police interrogation.57
The sporting view or fox-hunter rationale for limiting deception
should be rejected. It is not in society's interest to give the suspect and
the officer an equal chance to prevail in an interrogation. Society is
not indifferent as to who wins the hunt.58 There is no reason, constitu
tional or otherwise, that guilty defendants deserve an opportunity to
avoid prosecution or conviction.59 Interrogation is not a game in which
a suspect matches wits with the police. Law enforcement should be
encouraged to build the strongest possible case against a defendant,
and one of law enforcement's goals is to solve a crime by obtaining a
confession from the wrongdoer. Moreover, other types of evidence are
not excluded or limited simply because they make conviction more
likely. For example, DNA, fingerprint, and videotape evidence can be
even more damning than a confession. Yet no one suggests that by
collecting such evidence and introducing it at trial the police create
some unfair inequality between the police and the defendant. Nor do
we suggest that such powerful evidence makes a trial futile for the de
fendant because it creates such a strong case for the prosecution. The
community benefits when a case is strong, and when a guilty defen
dant either pleads guilty or is convicted by being found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
B.

Equality Among Suspects: The Equal Protection Rationale

The "equal protection" rationale for limiting interrogation ad
dresses the purported problem that some criminals are smarter, more
sophisticated, or more able to resist the pleas of interrogators to con
fess than are other criminals. Stated in a favorable light, the equal pro
tection rationale means only that all suspects should be equally aware

57. Professor George Dix, one of the leading proponents of the sporting view of interro
gation, has concluded that "[a] major objective of the law of confessions . . . should be re
garded as assuring that a person who confesses does so with as complete an understanding of
his tactical position as possible." George E. Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit,
and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1 WASH. U. L.Q. 275, 330-31 ( 1975 ) ; see also Edwin D.
Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 61 ( 1968)
("[E]ffective measures to right the imbalance created by the 'inherently coercive' atmo
sphere might be no less than tantamount to the abolition of the institution.").
58. See Gerald Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1443 ( 1985 ) .
59. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 32 ("What earned the fair chance ar
gument Bentham's derisive fox-hunter's label was its suggestion that, as an end in itself, even
guilty defendants should have a fair chance for acquittal."); George C. Thomas III, An
Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 812 ( 1995 ) ("Noth
ing - not even the tired cliche that the United States has an accusatorial and not an inquisi
torial system of justice - will make [the fox-hunter] argument work once it is exposed as a
call to give guilty suspects a better chance at acquittal." (reviewing GRANO, supra)).
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of their rights.6() But when this rationale is viewed more expansively, it
means that foolish, ignorant, and unsophisticated suspects must be
given the same chance as experienced, knowledgeable suspects to re
sist interrogation.61
Proponents of the equal protection rationale have stated that it is
"unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out and take
advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a ci�izen."62 Such a
view may have some validity when applied to truly mentally impaired
individuals. But if psychological vulnerabilities are meant to include
anything that makes a person more likely to confess - from a moder
ately low I.Q. to a docile personality - than the propriety of interro
gating almost any suspect is doubtful. Although the Due Process
Clause may require some additional protections for particularly young
or impaired suspects, it surely does not protect the foolish and unso
phisticated criminal from himself. In fact, society benefits because
some suspects confess.63
Because Miranda guarantees that all suspects are aware of their
rights, there is no need to further equalize suspects' ability or inclina
tion to invoke those rights and prevent interrogations. There is no
doubt that a foolish or unsophisticated suspect is far more likely to
confess than is a strong, smart, sophisticated suspect. But this logical
occurrence should not be troubling. The foolish suspect is also more
likely to consent to a search, to leave fingerprints and other clues at
the crime scene, to be slow or noisy, or to speak loosely to new ac
quaintances who may be undercover officers. The community is
pleased when any of these things happen because the criminal is more
likely to be caught. Therefore, we should not be troubled when the
suspect's folly leads him to confess when questioned.

60. See Caplan, supra note 58, at 1456 ("Suspects who do not know their rights, or do
not assert them, as a consequence of some handicap - poverty, lack of education, emotional
instability - should not, it is felt, fare worse than more accomplished suspects who know
and have the capacity to assert their rights.").
61. See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as A Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 41 (1981) (noting that deceptive interrogation tactics "work unevenly by
undermining the inexperienced and ignorant [while] having little effect on the hardened
criminal."); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 872
(1981) (stating under the pre-Miranda voluntariness test, the "vulnerable were more likely
to be on the losing end of a successful police interrogation" (reviewing YALE KAMISAR,
POLICE lNTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980)) ).
62. Schulhofer, supra note 61 , at 872.
63. Thomas, supra note 59, at 812 (noting that calls for equal treatment in the interroga
tion room "is like saying that because the police do not solve white-collar crimes as often as
crimes of violence, the State should release from custody some of the robbers and mug
gers").
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Trust Rationale

Some commentators have urged limits on deceptive interrogation
techniques in order to "facilitate trust relationships between suspects
and government [interrogators]."64 In fact, one commentator has ar
gued that the primary purpose of interrogation is not to solve crimes,
but rather to establish the interrogator's integrity and to elicit the sus
pect's trust.65 Interrogation is not, however, a civics lesson for criminal
suspects.66 Interrogation is a critical information-gathering tool in law
enforcement's arsenal for solving crimes and protecting the public.
Arguments based on the trust rationale ignore the chief purpose of in
terrogation and the practical realities of law enforcement. Moreover,
the trust rationale would require a ban on all undercover investigation.
The basis of the trust rationale is that harm occurs when the suspect
learns that the police lied to him during interrogation. Yet the suspect
in an undercover operation will be similarly harmed by learning that
an undercover agent's very identity was a lie.
There is no real support for the claim that suspects would be more
likely to confess to an officer whom they trusted.67 In addition, sus
pects do not expect complete honesty from law enforcement person
nel. Complete honesty would require an officer to inform a suspect
that it is most certainly not in the suspect's best interest to confess and
that the suspect would be best served by invoking his rights to silence
and counsel.68
64. Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6, 62 (1995) (noting that the lack of rules restricting lies
creates an atmosphere in which the government is expected to lie and manipulate); see also
Young, supra note 9, at 457-61; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 41 (interrogation about "gar
den variety crimes, such as petty theft and income tax evasion, [results in] an unhealthy at
mosphere of resentment and distrust").
65. Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 (asserting that an important police objective of
interrogation is to "provide important opportunities for police to distribute information to
suspects (and more indirectly, the public) about such things as integrity, honest dialogue, and
trustworthiness"); Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 65 (asserting that "we might sensibly con
clude that facilitating trust between individuals and their governments . . . is an important
goal to which the truth-seeking function sometimes must submit.").
66. See, e.g., Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6 ("[W]e should want to make interrogation a
particularly meaningful encounter for the suspect - one in which the values of trust and
trustworthiness are taught by the interrogator's own example - regardless of whether a con
fession ensues . . . . ); see also Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 70 ("[W]hat is proper behavior
between government and residents will closely resemble what is proper behavior in analo
gous relationships among private individuals . . . . ).
"

"

67. Young, supra note 9, at 455-68.
68. Professor Paris contends that suspects who are lied to and then convicted will re
member the lie when they are released, be resentful about it, and be less likely to act as up
standing citizens. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 830-31 . Yet suspects who are not lied to
may very well not confess, not be convicted, and will suffer no incarceration or other penalty
for their wrong-doing. This unpunished, at-large criminal is certainly no more likely to be an
upstanding citizen because he was not lied to by the police. Although he may have feelings
of trust for the honest officers, he is just as likely to feel contempt towards them for their
inability to apprehend and prosecute him for his wrong-doing.
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According to the trust rationale, breaches of trust ultimately deter
confessions because the resentful "suspect or defendant today may be
the witness tomorrow."69 There is no evidence, however, that wit
nesses have refused to talk to the police because the police are not al
ways truthful in talking to suspects. Witnesses have many reasons not
to cooperate with the police. For example, witnesses may be unwilling
to make court appearances for fear that a defendant will retaliate. In
addition, most people are already aware, if only from television, that
the police lie during interrogation. There has been no showing that
citizens have responded to this police ingenuity by declining to report
crimes, assist in investigations, or testify as witnesses. Even if it were
true that breaches of trust deterred confessions in the long-run, the
police may legitimately feel that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the
bush." When the police suspect a person of a particular, already
committed crime, it is not worth forgoing deception, on the off-chance
that the suspect might be a useful witness to some other person's fu
ture crime.
D.

Dignity Rationale

In advocating limits on police interrogation, some commentators
refer to a concern for the individual's "dignity."70 According to these
commentators, "pressuring a suspect to answer questions is unduly
cruel, violating the idea of the basic dignity of all individuals,"71 and
"[i]nterrogation tactics that are calculated to make the suspect feel
that he is not a decent or honorable person unless he confesses consti
tute direct assaults upon [his] dignity."72 The dignity concern would
appear to invalidate most interrogation. Both commentators for73 and
against74 substantial limits on interrogation refer to a need to respect
individual dignity. Nevertheless, acknowledgement of this need does
not translate easily into rules that distinguish acceptable and unac
ceptable interrogation practices.
69. Young, supra note 9, at 458.
70. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 40-41 (arguing that deceiving suspects does
not accord with dignity and autonomy).
71. Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 48 n.153; see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note
9, at 76-77 (asserting that Miranda "reflects the ages-old tension between preservation of
human dignity and solution of crimes."); Thomas S. Schrock et al., lnterrogational Rights:
Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 42 n.174 (1978) (citing Miranda's as
sumption that the constitutional basis of the privilege is the "respect a government . . . must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens").
72. White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 628 (stating that "criminal suspects have a
right to be treated in a manner that reflects a concern of their dignity as human beings").
73. See, e.g., id. at 627-28; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 51 (suggesting that police inter
rogation be replaced with questioning by a magistrate).
74. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 22 ("[N]otions of human dignity pro
vide limits on what government may do to solve crime.").
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Morality Rationale

Some commentators have asserted moral limits on interrogation
techniques.75 In particular, a number of these commentators76 have
taken cues from the work of moral philosopher Sissela Bok. Bok has
examined the justifications for lying throughout the whole range of
human interactions.77 She details the harms that lying can cause, but
concludes that lying is morally justified when there is no alternative, or
when the lie results in greater benefits than costs.78 Thus, Bok finds
that lying to one's "enemies" is j ustified. She does not specifically deal
with the matter of interrogation, but she does allow that criminals
could be considered "enemies."79
Reliance on morality as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation
practices requires two assumptions: 1) that lying and deception are
clearly an evil within the everyday relationships of citizens; and, 2)
that expectations about everyday relationships should also apply dur
ing the questioning of criminal suspects. Both of these assumptions
should be questioned. First, even apart from police questioning, in the
normal course of affairs among citizens, deception cannot be painted
as an unmitigated evil. In fact, deceptions large and small are an ac-

75. See, e.g. , Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 17 (concluding that the right to silence is
"morally justified"). But see State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250-51 (N.J. 1968) ("It is con
sonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity
in the detectional process. This must be so if Government is to succeed in its primary mission
to protect the first right of the individual to live free from criminal attack.").
76. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 819; Slobogin, supra note 8, at 777 (confirming
that his article principally relies on Sissela Bok's philosophical work); Robert P. Mosteller,
Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833, 833
(1997) ("I interpret Bok's approval of deception as further removed from authorizing the
deceptive investigative practices considered by Professor Slobogin than he does."); Al
schuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85 (citing Bok to assert that lying "raises deon
tological concerns that should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders of
deceptive interrogation").
77. See SiSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978)
(discussing whether there are such things as justifiable lies and the circumstances in which
they would occur).
78. See id. at 97, 1 14-29 (advising an evaluation of the alternatives, consequences, and
effects of lying).
79. See id. at 141-53; Commentators have reached widely divergent conclusions on
whether Bok's theories permit the regular use of deception during interrogation. The differ
ent views arise because of disagreement over when a criminal suspect should be deemed an
enemy within Bok's theory. Compare Paris, Lying, supra note 47, 817, 819-20 (relying on
Bok to find virtually all deception prohibited), with Slobogin, supra note 8, at 806 (relying on
Bok to find that suspects are "enemies" and can be lied to once they are held pursuant to a
probable cause determination). Professor Mosteller suggests "the most appropriate reading
of [Bok's] work is that the declared-enemies category applies only to a small subset of crimi
nal defendants . . . and not to the typical investigation of past individual criminal conduct."
Mosteller, supra note 76, at 834. Professor Alschuler suggests that the concerns raised by
reference to Bok's theories "should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders
of deceptive interrogation." Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85.
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cepted part of life - from enthusiastic sales pitches to polite greetings
and comments.80
Second, the rules and expectations governing discourse between
citizens does not necessarily apply to police questioning of criminal
suspects. Given society's interest in catching criminals, lying during in
terrogation can be justified as an appropriate means toward achieving
this important social end. Thus, conduct by the police towards a crimi
nal suspect cannot be judged by reference to what is morally worthy
during interactions between family members, friends, neighbors, and
acquaintances.
F.

Pragmatic Concerns

In contrast to principled criteria for limiting deceptive interroga
tion practices, commentators have also advanced pragmatic reasons
offered for limiting deception during interrogation. The chief prag
matic reason is the slippery slope argument that permitting lying dur
ing interrogation leads to widespread police lying in other contexts,
including warrants, affidavits, and sworn testimony.81 Some officers,
like some civilian witnesses, do lie under oath. But we assume that or
dinary people - such as witnesses, jurors, and even defendants - un
derstand the significance of the oath. Similarly, police officers know,
and should be expected to know, what is appropriate and lawful dur
ing the many different duties they perform - undercover agent, beat
officer, interrogator, affiant, and witness.82
80. William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV.
1903, 1910 (1993) [hereinafter Stuntz, Lawyers].
In moral terms, the most reasonable explanation for this behavior is that people make dis
tinctions, based on the relative harmfulness of telling the truth versus dissembling, on
whether the false statement is defensive or offensive, or on whether the motivation is selfish
or altruistic. Whether the conduct is wrong, and if so how much, depends on context.

Id.
81. See, e.g., Leo & Skolnick, supra note 32, at 9 ("When police are permitted to lie in
the interrogation context, why should they refrain from lying to judges when applying for
warrants, from violating internal police organization rules against lying, or from lying in the
courtroom?"); Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 829 ("[L]ying in the interrogation context may
lead to police perjury under oath."); Young, supra note 9, at 463 (asserting that lying during
interrogation will teach officers to become accomplished liars, and suggesting that officers
may lie to obtain an adrenaline rush).
82. Commentators raising these evidentiary concerns have not addressed the matter of
either undercover investigations or the use of ruses during searches. The dangers alleged to
arise from deceptive interrogation would seem just as likely, if not more likely, to arise from
the deceptions used during undercover operations or as ruses to search. If officers can be
relied on to understand the line between undercover operations and sworn testimony, they
are equally able to distinguish between interrogation and sworn testimony.
There is one pragmatic concern that has caused a court to exclude a confession because
of the use of a deceptive interrogation technique. In the 1989 case of Florida v. Cayward, 552
So. 2d 971 (1989), the state court held that there is a distinct difference between acceptable
verbal deception and fabrication of scientific documentation, which has the potential to
reach the courtroom. Cayward specifically held that the police should not have created a
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Criticism of the Non-reliability Rationales for Limiting
Interrogation Techniques

Many of the rationales offered for limiting deceptive interrogation
techniques, if taken to their logical extreme, would bar not only decep
tive interrogation techniques, but other investigative methods as well.
Commentators have failed to explain adequately why deception must
be barred or substantially limited during interrogation, while the de
ception used in other areas - such as undercover investigations, wire
taps, ruses, and informants - may continue.83 A bar on deception
during all stages of investigation would make it very difficult to solve
some crimes.84
Some commentators suggesting limits on interrogation techniques
appear most concerned with whether a technique is effective in elicit
ing confessions. Yet effectiveness is an inappropriate basis for limiting
interrogation. The voluntariness requirement does not bar effective
interrogation, or even reflect a general hostility to the concept of po
lice interrogation.85 "Indeed, far from being prohibited by the
Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are in-

false lab report purporting to connect semen found on the five-year-old rape and murder
victim to the nineteen-year-old suspect. Id. Relying on Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969),
the court acknowledged that verbal deception does not render a confession involuntary. The
court, however, distinguished deception by false documents. 552 So. 2d at 975. The court
concluded that there was an unacceptably high risk that such false evidence used during in
terrogation would somehow be included in the file and later considered true evidence at
trial. Id. at 975 (suggesting that the heavy caseload of courts may allow manufactured docu
ments to be used as substantive evidence against the defendant). Although this is a danger
that should be addressed by appropriate police and prosecution procedures, the Cayward
court's wholesale bar on documentary deception is overbroad.
83. See Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 679 (acknowledging that wiretaps and
informants are no more respectful of a suspect's dignity than police interrogations).
84. See Slobogin, supra note 8, at 778 ("Undercover work is by definition deceptive. It
normally involves outright lies.").
85. A few commentators have freely acknowledged their distaste for much or all police
interrogation. See, e.g. , BORCHARD, supra note 9, xvii (urging a rule "prohibiting the use in
evidence of all confessions made to the police"); Martin H. Belsky, Living with Miranda: A
Reply to Professor Grano, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 141 (1994) (analogizing intimidating in
terrogation to child abuse, spouse abuse, or rape); Driver, supra note 57, at 60-61 (1968) (ar
guing that abolition of police interrogation may be necessary to eliminate coercion);
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 91, 113 ("We have a philosophical predilection"
for the position "that confessions be considered of no evidentiary value."); Bernard
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 21, 46 (1961) (asserting that police interrogation is "irreconcilable" with the
self-incrimination privilege).
A number of commentators have proposed that magistrates, not the police, question
suspects. See, e.g. , Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles:
The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 908 (1995); Dripps, supra note 9; Paul
G. Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
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herently desirable."86 Presumably in recognition of .the importance of
confessions, some commentators urging limits have wisely shifted
away from arguments rooted largely in the effectiveness of interroga
tion techniques, and focused more on the reliability concern.87
IV. BASING LIMITS ON DECEPTION DURING INTERROGATION ON
RELIABILITY CONCERNS
A.

Commentator Recognition ofReliability as the Limiting Principle

Despite the wide variety of rationales proffered for the voluntari
ness requirement, scholars have increasingly emphasized the reliability
rationale.88 Under the reliability rationale, a court must ask whether
the procedure used to obtain a confession creates an unreasonable risk
that an innocent person would falsely confess.89
According to many of these scholars, empirical evidence shows
that deceptive interrogation practices cause a significant number of
false confessions.90 Because the reliability rationale focuses on pro
tecting innocent suspects, it offers a more palatable - and appropriate
- reason for limiting interrogation.91 The increased scholarly empha-

86. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977). Professor Grano has been
the most thoughtful commentator on the inherent value of confessions. See, e.g. , Joseph D.
Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1061 (1992); Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
174 (1988).
87. Compare, e.g. , White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 613-23 (1979) (focusing on a
concern that guilty suspects would make an irrational or poor choice about the desirability of
confessing), with White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 105 (emphasizing the risk of
false confessions and the reliability rationale for the voluntariness requirement).
88. See, e.g. , Alschuler, supra note 10, at 975 (including reliability as the chief reason for
advocating limits on the use of deception); White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 138-42
(discussing the constitutional basis and the formulation of procedural safeguards); Young,
supra note 9, 461 (including reliability as one basis for a broad argument against lying).
89. There are obvious parallels between the increased focus on reliability by critics of
police interrogation and the growing "innocence movement" by opponents of the death
penalty. See, e.g. , Sara Rimer, Support For a Moratorium On Executions Gets Stronger, N.Y.
TIMES, October 31, 2000, at Al8.
90. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, Consequences];
White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 110 (arguing that "the empirical evidence shows
that standard interrogation techniques are likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a
significant number of cases").
91. See Mosteller, supra note 76, at 837 ("[C]hanges in the law that increase procedural
protections are practical possibilities if they have a greater probability of protecting the in
nocent. This point dovetails with the reality of popular societal reaction and contemporary
press coverage: not surprisingly, it will be abuses of authority involving innocent people that
will likely provoke restrictions on investigative deception, and restrictions that are more
likely to prevent abuses affecting the innocent are, relatively speaking, more politically vi
able.").
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sis on false confessions has gained greater public support than the
more abstract arguments against deception. Professors Leo and Ofshe,
in particular, have been able to present their research and arguments
extensively in the popular press.92
B.

1.

The False Confession Costs of Deceptive
Interrogation Practices

Claims of Significant Numbers of False Confessions

A number of commentators who have urged limitations on inter
rogation techniques have made alarming assertions that the false con
fession problem is widespread.93 In recent years, Professors Leo and
Ofshe have claimed that " [p]olice-induced false confessions are a seri
ous problem for the American criminal j ustice system" because "con
fessions by the innocent still occur regularly."94 They assert that
"police-induced false confessions occur often and are highly likely to
lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution, conviction, and/or incarcera
tion of the innocent."95 They further claim that contemporary psycho
logical methods are "apt to cause an innocent person to confess,"96 and
that " [w]hen police interrogate suspects whose guilt is a mere possi
bility rather than a reasonable likelihood, they run a significant risk of

92. See, e.g. , Joseph P. Shapiro, The Wrong Men on Death Row, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, November 9, 1988; Robin Topping, False Confessions, Do the innocent sometimes
admit to crimes?, NEWSDAY, August 27, 1997, at A34; see also Rivera Live (NBC television
broadcast, April 30, 1997) available at 1997 WL 4603535 (explaining that the police use de
ception during interrogation).
93. See, e.g. , MARTIN YANT, PRESUMED GUILTY: WHEN INNOCENT PEOPLE ARE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 85 (1991) (false confessions "are commonplace"); see also EDWARD
D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS 8-9 (1964) (suggesting that five percent of convictions are mis
carriages of justice in which an innocent person is imprisoned); Alschuler, Constraint, supra
note 10, at 974 ("Especially when suspects are retarded or easily suggestible and when de
ception is coupled with intimations that leniency will follow confession, this misrepresenta
tion is likely to generate false confessions." (emphasis added)); Michael L. Perlin, "I'll Give
You Shelter from the Storm ": Privilege, Confidentiality, and Confessions of Crime, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV . 1699, 1700 (1996) (relying on Bedau, Radelet, and Huff to conclude that as
"many as 740 erroneous convictions each year may be due to false confessions"); Thomas N.
Thomas, Book Review, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 343, 344-46, 349 (1996) (reviewing LAWRENCE
WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (1993) and asserting,
without citation support, that "many confessions are false" and that both spontaneous and
police-induced false confessions are "common," and reviewing GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY (1992) and asserting
that Gudjonsson reveals that "the interrogation process . . . can easily evoke false confes
sions").
94. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983.
95. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Response to
Paul Cassell's "Balanced Approach " to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENY. L. REV.
1 1 35, 1139 (1997) [hereinafter Missing the Forest].
96. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983.
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eliciting a false confession."97 Finally, Professors Leo and Ofshe reach
the sweeping conclusion that "many investigators have recognized"
that "the problems caused by police-induced false confessions are sig
nificant [and] recurrent. "98
Professors Leo and Ofshe have found that "[i]t is well established
that psychologically-induced false confessions occur frequently
enough to warrant the concern of criminal justice officials, legislators
and the general public."99 In comments outside of their written work,
they have portrayed the false confession problem even more alarm
ingly, asserting that false confessions happen "all the time."100
Professors Leo and Ofshe are not alone in suggesting that the false
confession problem is widespread. For example, Professor White has
stated that false confessions are obtained in a "significant" number of
cases,101 and that police interrogation "often yields false confes
sions. "102 He concludes that the empirical data "indicates that confes
sions induced by standard interrogation methods are frequently un-

97. Id. at 986.
98. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 430.
99. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda:
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 561 (1998).
100. See Maugh II, supra note 6, at Al; Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 23,
1997) ("Innocent people confess all the time . . . . We know it happens all the time.");
Defense Expert Says Boy Forced to Confess, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 29, 1999, at
5-8 (quoting Dr. Ofshe as testifying that "people often confess to crimes they didn't commit
because of police tactics"). Professor Ofshe is reported to have claimed that as many as 60%
of people might falsely confess to a crime when interrogated. See Gail Johnson, False
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations, 6 8.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 719, 729 (1997) (citing CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
THE STORY OF A MURDER, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE STRUGGLE TO FREE A
"WRONG MAN" 97 (Donald S. Connery ed., 1996) (describing Professor Ofshe's comments
at a 1995 public forum in Hartford, Connecticut titled "Convicting the Innocent").
101 . White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("Over the past two decades, a sig
nificant number of suspects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led
them to give false confessions."); id. at 1 10 ("(S]tandard interrogation techniques [are] likely
to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a significant number of cases."). But see Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 488
(1996) (referring to the "esoteric problem of false confessions induced by noncoercive police
questioning") [hereinafter Cassell, Social Costs].
102. Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United
States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1209 n.4 (1980) ("Those who have sought to limit
police interrogation believe that interrogation, often carried out in secret, involves coercion,
and often yields false confessions."). Yet he also concedes that "(t)here are only a small
number of documented cases in which standard interrogation methods have led to indis
putably false confessions." White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131.
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trustworthy,"1 03 and that "standard interrogation methods precipitate a
significant number of false confessions."104
These repeated and widely-reported assertions that "contemporary
psychological methods" are "apt" to cause an innocent suspect to con
fess are verifiable and should be verified. 105 Yet, thus far, no one has
undertaken the research necessary to prove the claims.106
2.

Empirical Data on False Confessions Is Limited

These alarming claims that false confessions are widespread do not
hold up under scrutiny. Although there are reports - in both the aca
demic and popular press - about individual instances of purportedly
false confessions, there is no sound empirical proof that such instances
are widespread.1 07 Thus far, the reports have failed to rebut the intui
tive view1 08 that the number of persons incarcerated because of police
induced false confessions is quite small.
The existing research is almost entirely anecdotal and focuses on
the causes, not the scope, of the problem. Sweeping references to sig
nificant, substantial, and widespread instances of false confessions are
supported by reference to perhaps a few dozen indisputably false con
fessions. To justify the claim that the false confession problem is wide
spread, the new research will need to be based on a statistically signifi
cant, randomly-drawn sample of persons who gave confessions during
interrogation. To determine whether there is a substantial concern
that any of the confessors may actually be innocent, researchers would

103. White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. Yet he also concludes that it is
"impossible to estimate" the "number of false confessions," White, Involuntary Confession,
supra note 10, at 2039, and that "there are only a small number of documented cases in
which standard interrogation methods have led to indisputably false confessions." White,
False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131.
104. White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2042; see also White, False
Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("Over the past two decades, a significant number of sus
pects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led them to give false con
fessions.").
105. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 10, at 983.
106. See id. at 1 135 (acknowledging that there has been no research "to quantify the
number and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of
justice").
107. See Cassell, Balanced Approaches, supra note 7, at 1 125-26 (stating that "the em
pirical linchpin" for the proposals of Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler "is simply missing"). Despite
the spirited, on-going debate about police interrogation and confessions, there are surpris
ingly few studies of confession evidence. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M.
KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM ix (1993) ("[I]n contrast to the massive num
bers of eyewitness studies, the topic of confession evidence has been almost completely ig
nored by psychologists and other social scientists.").
108. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("The idea that a suspect, who
is neither insane nor the victim of physical coercion, will confess to a crime he did not com
mit seems counterintuitive.").
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need to examine all available evidence, starting with the court records.
It appears that no one has attempted such statistically sound research
on false confessions.
a. Most Research Is on the Causes and Types, Not the Number, of
False Confessions. Based on the assertions of a widespread false con
fession problem, one would expect to see hundreds, if not thousands,
of false confession cases documented. Yet no such evidence exists. In
stead, research on false confessions falls into two categories. First,
there are articles referring to collections of several, or at most several
dozen, case histories of allegedly wrongful convictions because of false
confessions.109 Second, there are studies, generally by psychologists,
not lawyers, on the causes of false confessions.
To justify substantial limits on the ability of the police to solve
crimes by interrogating suspects, two questions must be answered: 1)
why do some suspects falsely confess; and 2) how many false confes
sions are actually given. The first question, why a person would falsely
confess, must be answered to determine whether limiting certain po
lice conduct would even have the effect of preventing false confessors
from confessing. For example, if most false confessors are like the de
fendant in Colorado v. Connelly,110 who confessed independently of
police action, then there is no point in limiting police conduct. Even if
the research should establish that police conduct can cause false con
fessions, we cannot decide whether to limit that conduct without an
swering the second question on how often the conduct causes false
confessions. Although there is a fair bit of research on the first ques
tion - why a person might falsely confess111 - there is absolutely
none that adequately answers the second question - how often this
phenomenon takes place. Advocates of limits on interrogation tactics
fail to make the critical distinction between research on why anyone
might falsely confess and how often suspects actually make false con
fessions.
·

109. Professors Leo and Ofshe present twenty-nine cases, involving mostly homicides,
from 1973 to 1996. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 429, 435, 478. (The
authors present sixty disputed confession cases, but only twenty-nine of the defendants were
convicted or pied guilty). During that time, the police interrogated many thousands of sus
pects for homicide. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and
Lost Confessions - and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 506 n.36 (sur
veying 80% of the 460,000 persons arrested for murder and manslaughter according to the
FBI reports) [hereinafter Cassell, Protecting the Innocent]; see also "Felony Sentences in the
United States 1996," BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ 175045 (reporting
that there were 1 1 ,766 murder cases in the United States in 1996).
1 10. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
1 1 1. See, e.g., Gail Johnson, 6 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 719 at 726, 729 (explaining that
" [m]odern psychology has come a long way towards a more complex and sophisticated un
derstanding of the interplay of factors to leading to false confessions," but deeming "unan
swerable" how many people would falsely confess during interrogation).
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At best, the existing research has shown: 1) that certain interroga
tion techniques are more likely than other techniques to result in false
confession; and 2) that certain types of people - such as juveniles and
the mentally impaired - appear somewhat more likely than the aver
age suspect to give a false confession. The research has not demon
strated, however, how often the techniques in question result in false
confessions, nor what number of suspects in these more vulnerable
groups give false confessions. The fact that persons in these vulnerable
groups appear to be over-represented in the few false confession cases
that have been collected and examined does not demonstrate that per
sons in these groups give false confessions at a substantial rate. The
existing research is interesting, but it provides no basis for imposing
limits on the current practice of using deception during interrogation.
Commentators asserting that there is a widespread, significant
problem with false confessions have relied primarily on three scholarly
works: 1 ) the 1987 Bedau-Radelet study of 350 purportedly erroneous
convictions in potentially capital cases since 1900;1 12 2) the 1998 Leo
Ofshe study of sixty post-Miran da cases involving purportedly false
confessions; and, 3) Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson's 1992 book on the causes
and types of false confessions.113 These works suggest only why an in
nocent person might falsely confess, 114 not how many people actually
do falsely confess.
1 12. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 107, at 84
(lamenting that Bedau and Radelet's review "has not received the attention it deserves" and
uncritically describing all 350 examples in the study as involving an "innocent person"); see
also Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 433 n.9 (relying on Bedau and Radelet).
1 13. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY (1992). See, e.g., Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 972-73 (citing
Gudjonsson); Thomas, supra note 93, at 350 (citing only Bedau and Radelet as support for
the assertion that police-induced false confessions are "common").
Many commentators also refer to the much earlier work of Edward Borchard, which
presents sixty-five cases of purportedly wrongful convictions of innocent persons. See
BORCHARD, supra note 9; see, e.g. , Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 433 n.7.
Borchard acknowledged that only a very few of these sixty-five cases involved false confes
sions. He found that the causes or alleged error were "in the main, mistaken identification,
circumstantial evidence (from which erroneous inferences are drawn), or perjury, or some
combination of these factors." BORCHARD, supra, at viii.
Commentators also refer to two other books: JEROME FRANK AND BARBARA FRANK,
NOT GUILTY (1957) (reviewing cases of convictions of allegedly innocent persons), and
RADIN, supra note 93. Other more recent works cited with some regularity are: 1) Professor
Saul M. Kassin's and Professor Lawrence S. Wrightsman's writings on the causes of false
confessions, see, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM.
PSYCHOL. 221 (1997); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67-94 (Saul M. Kassin &
Lawrence S. Wrightsman, eds., 1985); and 2) Professor Ronald Huff's 1986 opinion survey
about false confessions, see C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful
Conviction and Public Policy, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986).
114. Professors Leo and Ofshe have identified three types of false confessors in cases
where the police allegedly induced a false confession. See Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess
Falsely, supra note 10, at 998-1000. The first type, the stress-compliant false confessor,
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The widely-cited study by Professors Bedau and Radelet does not
examine any randomly drawn sample of cases. Instead, Professors
Bedau and Radelet collected 350 cases from the many thousands de
cided in this century when the defendant received or could have re
ceived a capital sentence. Although they concluded that the confession
was false in forty-nine of these cases, they acknowledge that few, if
any, of these forty-nine allegedly false confessions were caused by po
lice deception. As they explain, some of the confessions were "the re
sult of mental illness;" one defendant confessed "as a joke;" and an
other claimed to have confessed "to · impress his girlfriend."115 In
selecting and describing just forty-nine cases of allegedly false confes
sions from the thousands of capital or potentially capital cases decided
in this century, Professors Bedau and Radelet provide no support for
the claim that false confessions are widespread. Their research is of
particularly limited use in evaluating interrogation techniques used
now, because they included so many cases from the earlier part of the
century, when both discrimination against minority suspects and the
use of physical abuse against all suspects were far more common.116
In their 1998 study of false confessions, Professors Leo and Ofshe
presented a collection of sixty cases, selected from the many hundreds
of thousands of confession cases decided after Miranda, in which they
believed the confessions were false. As they acknowledge, those sixty
cases "do not constitute a statistically adequate sample of false confes
sion cases. "117 Thus, their study focused not on the number of false

"makes this choice to escape an experience that for him has always been excessively stressful
or one that has become intolerably punishing because it has gone beyond the bounds of a
legally proper interrogation." Id. at 997. Within the context of the legal doctrine about vol
untariness, the "stress-compliant" false.confessor just seems like another way of saying that
the physical and psychological pressures are so great that an innocent person would confess.
The existing law, under the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness, would almost
surely bar any such pressures that would make an innocent person confess.
The second type, the coerced-compliant false confessor, confesses "(i)n response to clas
sically coercive interrogation techniques such as threats of harm and/or promises of leni
ency . . . . " Id. at 998. The third type, the persuaded false confessor, confesses after becoming
convinced that it is more likely than not that he committed the crime, despite possessing no
memory of having done so. Id. at 999 ("A non-coerced persuaded false confession is elicited
when an investigator relies on routine influence techniques of interrogation, whereas a co
erced-persuaded false confession is elicited when threats, promises, or other legally coercive
interrogation techniques are added to this mix.").
Professor White categorizes false confessions similarly but uses only two categories. The
"coerced-compliant" confession occurs when "a suspect knows he is confessing falsely but
confesses in order to obtain some goal or 'escape from a stressful or an intolerable situa
tion' . . . . " White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 109 (quoting GUDJONSSON, supra
note 113, at 228). "Coerced-internalized" confessions occur when a "suspect comes to be
lieve in his own guilt." Id.
1 15. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 112, at 63.
1 16. Fewer than ten percent of the 350 cases involved defendants convicted after 1977,
when the Supreme Court upheld the revised death penalty.
1 17. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 435.
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confession cases, but only on whether there were any shared charac
teristics in the very small number of false confession cases that were
presented.
Dr. Gudjonsson's book, the leading work on false confessions,118 is
based on cases outside of this country.119 The book contains illustrative
case histories of false confessions, but no random sample of confession
cases. Dr. Gudjonsson focuses on perhaps a few dozen cases of pur
portedly false confessions.12° He offers interesting case studies of a
number of individual cases, but no data on the total number of false
confession cases.
Thus far, the studies on false confessions fail to prove, or even
strongly to suggest, that a significant number of persons have been
wrongly convicted because of false confessions obtained by police us
ing deceptive interrogation techniques.121 The commentators have not
1 18. See Scheflin, supra note 4, at 1296 ("The leading text on false confessions is
Gudjonsson's 1992 book, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and Testimony.").
1 19. Dr. Gudjonsson conducted his research in Great Britain. His book is not necessar
ily helpful in understanding the interrogation process in this country because the process in
Great Britain is somewhat different. On the one hand, the British have no analogue to
Miranda and no right to remain silent; on the other hand, the British police are more con
strained in their use of deception. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 113, at 278; see also James
R. Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confessions Expert Testimony, Department of Army
Pamphlet 27-50-321 (August 1999) (discussing the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of
1984, sections 76 and 78, which states that deception may render a confession unreliable).
120. See Kassin & Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 113, at 67-94. Both authors are psychology
professors.
121. The one study that concludes that there are a large number of wrongful convictions
of innocent persons, and at least suggests that some portion of these many cases might be
due to false confessions, is utterly flawed. See C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986). In 1986,
Professors Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin asserted that a "conservative estimate" of the number
of wrongful convictions of innocent persons each year was 6,000. They arrived at this num
ber without assembling a random sample or examining any case files. Instead, they obtained
a figure for the frequency of wrongful convictions by surveying the opinions of 177 persons
involved in the criminal justice system, from sheriffs to judges to public defenders. It is
hardly clear why all of these people were deemed to know a figure that most other research
ers assert is either elusive or unknowable.
The survey was both framed and interpreted in a highly misleading manner. Respon
dents were asked to estimate the number of wrongful convictions. They were given only the
following choices as possible answers: Never, Less than 1 %, 1-5%, 6-10%. Because just one
case of wrongful conviction would have to exclude the answer "never," not surprisingly, few
respondents gave that answer. Also hardly surprising was the fact that the overwhelming
majority of the respondents chose the next lowest category offered as a choice, "Less than
1 % ." Of course, the category of all estimates "Less than 1 %" but greater than zero is quite
broad. It includes estimates as high as 1 out of 101 as well as estimates of 1 in 1000, 1 in
10,000, 1 in 100,000, and, in fact, every barely perceptible estimate as long as it is higher than
zero. Thus, the construction of the survey question should have allowed the researchers to
reach almost no conclusion about the estimates by the respondents. Yet the researchers de
cided to simply take the mid-point of their very broad range and settled on an estimate of
one-half of 1 % or 1 in 200. They then multiplied this quite high rate of error by an enormous
figure representing the number of convictions in this country each year for serious crimes.
Thus, they were able to arrive at an alarmingly large number
6,000
of purportedly
-

-
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produced credible evidence that there is a serious problem that should
be addressed by substantially limiting police efforts to obtain confes
sions.122
b. Inclusion of Cases Without Convictions. The existing studies are
also weakened by the inclusion of persons who gave false confessions
but who were never brought to trial and convicted. For example, in
the Leo-Ofshe collection of sixty cases involving false confessions,
only 29 of the cases involved a person who was actually convicted after
making a false confession.123 In the remaining cases, the criminal jus
tice system successfully identified the unreliability of the confessions
at some point before conviction. Instances in which the system worked
as it is supposed to - by weeding out false confessions before an er
roneous conviction - do not provide a sound basis for drastically lim
iting police efforts to obtain confessions from all suspects, many of
whom are guilty of serious offenses.124 Thus, researchers should focus
on those instances of allegedly false confessions in which the defen
dant has exhausted his appeals.
c. Inappropriate Sources to Establish Innocence. To verify a
wrongful conviction, it is necessary to determine whether a convicted
person is, in fact, innocent. Actual innocence is a certainty in only a
small fraction of the cases that researchers have used to illustrate the

wrongful convictions. This number, however, is based on a completely speculative assump
tion that the respondents were reporting estimates of 1 in 200, rather than much lower esti
mates.
This sleight of hand with statistics tells us very little about how many wrongful convic
tions actually occurred, or even much about what the 177 respondents believe. In conducting
surveys about matters that may be quite rare, survey questions must be carefully crafted to
allow for answers that reveal the true rarity of the matter being studied.

122. Even while asserting that there is a significant false confession problem, some
commentators have acknowledged that there are, in fact, few documented cases. See, e.g. ,
White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2043 (recognizing that "a court might con
clude that the empirical data" on the false confession problem is "tentative and fragmen
tary"). Professors Leo and Ofshe, tacitly acknowledging that their list of cases falls well short
of establishing that false confessions happen regularly, assert that "it is reasonable to assume
that the reported cases represent only the proverbial tip of the false confession iceberg." Leo
& Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 139. No such assumption is reasonable. The
actual frequency of false confessions should be established by studying a random sample of
confession cases and not by speculation based largely on isolated cases reported in the me
dia.
123. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 473.
124. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 536. ("If a person who has
made a false confession is not convicted - because the police do not arrest, the prosecutor
does not indict, or the jury does not convict - then the screens in the system have at least
worked to prevent the ultimate miscarriage of justice, the conviction of an innocent per
son."); see also Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of
Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 408 (1987) ("A misidentified defendant who goes to trial un
doubtedly runs a terrible risk of being convicted in error, but it does not take blind faith in
trials by jury to believe that the risk is considerably smaller than it is for a guilty defendant
and that this highly imperfect filter reduces the number of erroneous convictions considera
bly.").
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problem of wrongful convictions in general and false confessions in
particular. Innocence is most clearly and easily established by the
criminal justice system itself, when it overturns convictions on grounds
of innocence. Actual innocence is unequivocally established, for ex
ample, when a court overturns a confessor's conviction because DNA
evidence establishes that the defendant did not commit the crime.
There are few cases, however, involving j udicial determinations of
wrongful convictions in cases of purportedly false confessions. In fact,
many of the persons whom scholars have labeled as innocent are still
in prison because no judge has agreed with the researchers' and de
fendant's claims of innocence.
The methodology used to establish the innocence of convicted per
sons raises significant concerns. Because there are so few judicial de
terminations of actual innocence, researchers have looked for other
evidence demonstrating innocence. They have made some claims of
innocence based, at least in part, on questionable information such as
newspaper assertions and the defendant's own claims of innocence.125
The reliance on questionable sources to establish innocence is ap
parent, for example, in the Bedau-Radelet study of 350 cases of pur
portedly wrongful convictions. Professors Bedau and Radelet assert
that, in these cases, the defendant was subsequently "found to be in
nocent" of the capital or potentially capital crime for which he was
convicted.126 The phrase "found to be innocent" would seem to suggest
that there was a judicial or other official determination of innocence.
In fact, for some of the cases, the finding of innocence is a conclusion
reached by Professors Bedau and Radelet. Many of the defendants
deemed innocent by them actually served their sentences or remain
imprisoned because the courts made no such finding of innocence.
Professors Bedau and Radelet do make several concessions. First, they
admit that the evidence convincing them of innocence in some cases
"may not convince others."127 Second, they admit that their decision to
include "a few borderline cases may look to other investigators to be
not only debatable but even incorrect."128 Third, they concede that
"the cases form a continuum, from those where the evidence for inno
cence is conclusive to those where the evidence is slight."129
125. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 578-79 (criticizing Leo and
Ofshe's use of seemingly questionable sources); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell,
Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122
(1988).
126. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 1 12, at 24; see also id. at 38 (asserting that the defendants had been "proved to be innocent").
127. Id. at 47.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 47-48. They also concede that " [i]n none of these cases, however, can we
point to the implication of another person or to the confession of the true killer, much Jess to
any official action admitting the execution of an innocent person." Id. at 74.
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In addition to these admitted defects, a significant problem with
the Bedau-Radelet study is that it appears to give greater weight to
potentially unreliable post-conviction statements than to the decisions
of j uries and trial judges that were upheld by appellate judges.13° The
method of establishing innocence used by Professors Leo and Ofshe is
questionable. To determine whether a confession is probably false and
the defendant probably innocent, they examined the defendant's own
post-admission narrative and looked for evidence corroborating the
confession. This method of determining innocence is can be "highly
subjective. "131 Despite these limitations, other researchers have incor
rectly claimed that the Bedau-Radelet studies present "known" in
stances of wrongful convictions of false confessors.132
C.

The Value of Deception During Interrogation

Deceptive interrogation techniques have value. Deception is
needed to obtain some confessions, confessions are needed to obtain
some convictions, and those convictions provide great value to society
- specifically to existing victims, future potential victims, and inno
cent persons who might have been wrongly charged absent a confes
sion by the true perpetrator.133

130. See Markman & Cassell, supra note 125, at 126.
131. James R. Agar II, The Admissibility of False Confessions Expert Testimony,
Department of Army Pamphlet 27-50-321 (August 1999); Cassell, Protecting the Innocent,
supra note 109, at 505 ("[I]n a significant number of their cases, the 'innocent' defendants
were in all likelihood guilty."). Moreover, for some cases Professors Leo and Ofshe refer
chiefly to media accounts as the source of evidence of innocence. See Leo & Ofshe,
Consequences, supra note 90, at 449. Media accounts are not necessarily a reliable source for
definitively establishing .innocence. The press bias may be to find an innocent person
wrongly convicted, since it is not news that a guilty person is in prison.
132. See Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 973 n.78 ("For an indication of the fre
quency of known false confessions (no more than the tip of the iceberg)," see the works of
Professors White, Bedau and Radelet, Leo and Ofshe). Professor Alschuler, like others, has
accepted the studies by Professors Leo and Ofshe, and Professors Bedau and Radelet, with
out questioning what evidence there is of innocence. Professor Alschuler refers to these
studies as concerning cases of "known" innocence, even though the researchers themselves
concede that in many of their cases, the innocence is, at best, possible or probable, and there
has been no judicial acknowledgement of the purportedly "known" innocence of the defen
dant. See also Gregory W. O'Reilly, Comment on lngraham's "Moral Duty" To Talk and the
Right to Silence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 539 (1997) (relying on Bedau and
Radelet after asserting that "the innocent are convicted").
133. See Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1905 ("Deception and advantage taking
are . . . at the core of criminal investigation . . . . ").
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Deception Is Needed to Obtain Some Confessions

In some instances, the police must use deception to obtain a con
fession from a suspect.134 Relatively few suspects enter the interroga
tion room and promptly offer a full and truthful confession of their
wrongdoing. Confessions usually occur only after some form of decep
tion by the officer, from hiding the officer's true feelings about the
suspect or the nature of the crime to exaggerating the strength of the
evidence. Officers use deception because experience has taught them
that it works.135 Effective interrogations necessarily depend upon a
single but significant lie - the "Big Lie." The Big Lie is that it is
somehow in the suspect's best interest to confess. In reality, making an
uncounseled confession to an officer is rarely in a suspect's best inter
est.136 If an interrogator were truly honest, he would inform the sus
pect that it is generally not in the suspect's best interest to make any

134. Professor lnbau, author of the leading police manual, has explained that "[i]n
dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with criminal suspects who may actu
ally be innocent, the interrogator must of necessity employ less refined methods than are
considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, everyday affairs by and between law
abiding citizens." lnbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 19. Inbau observes that con
versation between officer and suspect during interrogation does not proceed as it would be
tween two citizens in everyday life. Id. Interrogation is part of criminal investigation, not
everyday life. There is no reason to require interrogation during an investigation to be any
more genteel than a search and seizure during an investigation. For example, a person who
seems to have lost an item does not upend a friend's house and search for it even if he has
some suspicion that the friend accidentally or intentionally obtained the item. Yet the police,
based on probable cause, may conduct a probing search of a home that will be fairly un
pleasant for the homeowner.
135. In his observational study of almost 200 interrogations, Professor Leo found that it
was commonplace for the police to confront the suspect with false evidence. He found that
in 30% of the interrogations, the police confronted the suspect with false evidence of his
guilt. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact ofMiranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 623 (1996).
Most commentators do not dispute the point that deception is necessary to obtain some
confessions. See, e.g., White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 1 1 1 (stating that "interroga
tion is indispensable to law enforcement"). But see Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 ("It is
far from clear that the amount of information derived from interrogations would be signifi
cantly reduced if police were required to tell the truth."). In fact, the arguments against de
ception are based on the notion that deception is too effective, and that a confession is far
more likely to be obtained when the interrogating officer uses some deception than when the
officer is entirely truthful. Thus, some of the arguments against deception reflect a view that
the police should simply get along with fewer confessions.
136. See DA YID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 213 (Ballantine
Books 1993) ("The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect's interest to talk with police
will forever be the catalyst in any criminal interrogation. It is a fiction propped up against
the greater weight of logic itself . . . . "); H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 210 (1988)
(" 'Anybody who stops and thinks about it has to know that he's hurting himself by admit
ting to a crime . . . .' " (quoting a police officer)); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1926 ("If
suspects fully comprehended the nature and scope of their legal rights and the likely conse
quences of relinquishing them, there would be very few police station confessions.").
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statement at all.137 Such a completely honest interrogator would find
confessions awfully scarce.

2.

Confessions Are Needed to Obtain Many Convictions

a. Convictions Lost Because of the Absence of a Confession. Some
cases can be successfully prosecuted only with a confession from the
defendant. The state has an extremely high burden of proof. Without a
statement from the defendant, the physical evidence and testimony
from witnesses are sometimes insufficient to obtain a conviction.138 In
other cases, there is little physical evidence, the defendant conceals his
face, or there are no witnesses. Some of the most heinous crimes, such
as child abuse, may involve no physical evidence and no witnesses,
other than the child who may be incompetent to testify due to age.
Obviously, the more clever and sophisticated the criminal is, the less
likely he is to carelessly leave behind physical evidence or witnesses.
Confessions will sometimes offer the only hope of convicting the
guilty.139
b. Value of a Confession Even If Not Essential to Conviction. A
confession may be extremely valuable in a case, even if not essential to
a conviction. First, resolution of a case because of a confession allows
the police to use their valuable and limited resources to investigate
other crimes. Second, confessions greatly reduce the risk that police
137. In the overwhelming number of cases it is contrary to a suspect's self-interest to
confess because a confession will increase the chance that the suspect will be convicted and a
penalty will be imposed. But Justice Scalia has pointed out that the suspect may, in fact,
achieve some rehabilitative benefit by confessing, rather than continuing to conceal, his
wrong-doing. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
( '(A]dmissio[n] of guilt . . . , if not coerced, (is] inherently desirable,' . . . because it ad
vances the goals of both 'justice and rehabilitation.' " (quoting United States v.
Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) and Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 488 n.23
(1974))). Given that the nation's prisons serve more punitive than rehabilitative goals, and
that rehabilitation can also occur in a private setting outside of incarceration, confessing will
usually impose greater costs than benefits on the defendant.
"

138. See Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961):
Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses frequently occur
about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there cannot be found innocent
human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains - if police investigation is not to be
balked before it has fairly begun - but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them
questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense pre
cisely because they are suspected of implication in it.

See also Inbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 147 ("Many criminal cases, even
when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by
means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of informa
tion obtained from the questioning of other criminal suspects.").
139. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 905-15 (1999) (surveying
fifty-nine prosecutors and finding that 61 % of confessions were deemed necessary to obtain
a conviction; also finding that defendants who confessed were convicted in 78.9% of cases,
while those questioned unsuccessfully were convicted in 49.3% of cases).
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suspicion will fall on an innocent person. If there is no confession from
the true wrongdoer, there is a risk that an innocent person could be
investigated, arrested, or even falsely convicted and incarcerated.140
Third, the existence of a confession may permit the prosecution to ob
tain a suitable plea agreement. A confession may so strengthen the
prosecution's case that a plea bargain to an inappropriate lesser of
fense can be avoided. Guilty pleas free the courts to move quickly to
resolve other cases, spare trauma to the victim, and avoid the financial
drain on judicial and prosecutorial resources that would be consumed
by a trial.

3.

Value of Convictions Obtained Because of Confessions

Before considering the proposals to limit substantially various in
terrogation techniques, it is necessary to consider the obvious benefits
of resolving a criminal investigation with a conviction. First, the great
est value to society is the incapacitation of the criminal. During the
time that the offender is incarcerated, he is unable lo commit new
crimes and victimize others. Many criminals commit far more crimes
than the few for which they are arrested. Leaving a criminal at large
imposes substantial risks on society. Second, if a criminal is not appre
hended and convicted, the victim continues to suffer even after recov
ering from the direct physical and financial injuries caused by the
criminal. The victim's emotional recovery is less certain and takes far
longer if the victim knows that the criminal remains at large. Both the
victim's anxiety about suffering additional harm and the victim's un
addressed desire for justice are significant costs incurred when the ab
sence of a confession means that the perpetrator cannot be con
victed.141
Finally, if the offender is not convicted, there is no opportunity for
rehabilitation. A conviction allows the court not only to incarcerate and thereby incapacitate - the offender, but also to attempt to reha
bilitate the offender with a wide variety of programs, including proba
tionary and parole supervision, boot camp, drug and alcohol treat
ment, educational opportunities, parenting programs, and counseling.
Such supervision benefits the offender who may then be able to lead a
rewarding life as a productive citizen. Society benefits, of course, when
the offender is rehabilitated and, thus, is no longer a threat to the
physical, emotional, and financial well-being of innocent persons.
1 40. See Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 109, 537-38 (1998); Stuntz, Lawyers,
supra note 80, at 1931 ("[M]aking government investigation easier improves the welfare of
innocent defendants.").
141. See, e.g., Tatjana Hornle, Distribution of Punishment: The Role of a Victim 's
Perspective, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 182 (1999) ("[A]n important function of the [crimi
nal] sentence lies in its message to the victim."). See generally DOUGLAS BELOOF, VICTIMS
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7-33 (1998).
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Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Deception
During Interrogation

Major policy changes, such as greatly limiting interrogation, should
be implemented only after the costs and benefits of making a change
have been adequately considered, properly weighed, and balanced
against each other.

1.

The False Confession Cost from Permitting Deception:
Numbers Do Matter

In assessing the cost of deceptive interrogation practices, in terms
of wrongful convictions resulting from false confessions, numbers do
matter. Laws that could affect nearly everyone in the country should
not be based on a few compelling, even disturbing, anecdotes.142 The
number of false confessors must be compared to the number of true
confessors, and the number of false confessions we could avoid must
be compared to the number of true confessions we would lose. Yet,
commentators advocating substantial limits on interrogation tech
niques have relied for support on anecdotal evidence of the false con
fession problem. The presentation of anecdotal evidence on false con
fessions may be sufficient to establish a need for additional, and more
scientific, study of the matter, but anecdotal reports alone do not pro
vide the evidence which is needed to properly weigh the costs and
benefits of deception.
a. Problems with Basing Policy on Anecdotal Evidence. Anecdotes
do have value. The recitation of anecdotes, which evoke an emotional
response, can be persuasive evidence that a problem exists.
" [A]necdotes can crystallize and mobilize public opinion on even the
most dull and arcane subject. Unlike statistics, anecdotes offer sim
plicity and transparency. Little specialized knowledge is necessary to
become outraged by a bad anecdote or self-congratulatory about a
good one."143 For some issues, the narrative in anecdotes "puts a hu
man face on a particular problem, brings new voices to the table,
makes plain unexamined assumptions and implicit bias, and can en
hance the probability of a real solution by transforming the terms of
discourse."144 But anecdotes alone cannot provide the basis for major

142. There is often criticism of laws with broad application that were hastily enacted
after a single heinous crime. See, e.g. , 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, August 20,
2000) (Professor Franklin Zimring concluded that California's three strikes legislation "was
passed in the heat of passion" after the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-old Polly
Klass by a defendant with a long criminal record).
143. David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 800-01
(1998).
144. Id. at 807-08.
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policy or legal changes.14s The anecdotes, which capture the attention
of academics, the press, the public, or legislators, must be shown to be
representative of a much larger group of such cases.
Anecdotes standing alone, however, provide no evidence on the
frequency of the problem they illustrate. That is why "anecdotal evi
dence is heavily discounted in most fields. "146 The persuasive power of
an anecdote, especially a well-told anecdote, can obscure the limited
role of anecdotes in proving that a problem is widespread, or in ana
lyzing the problem.147 Although " [s]cientists and medical researchers
reject anecdotal evidence for precisely these reasons . . . [t]he rest of
the population is less cautious."148 Lawyers, unlike scientists, often
embrace anecdotal evidence.149 In relying on anecdotes, commentators
have established neither the frequency of false confessions nor that
false confessors in the anecdotal reports are typical of the many de
fendants who give confessions.1so
Professors Leo and Ofshe have asserted that "the important ques
tion is not whether false confessions are pervasive or isolated," but
why they occur and how they can be prevented.1s1 In fact, the question
of whether false confessions are pervasive or isolated most certainly is
an important question. When the preventive measures suggested
145. See id. at 807 ("[T]he adverse consequences of generalizing from an unrepresenta
tive anecdote can be severe. Unfortunately, as the underlying subject matter becomes more
complex and the trade-offs become tougher, the temptation to use anecdotal evidence be
comes overwhelming.").
146. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System - and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1 147, 1161 (1992) ("Because we eas
ily remember captivating little stories, when called on to estimate how frequent various legal
events and outcomes are, we mistakenly associate the ease of anecdote recall with the nu
merousness of the type of case.").
147. Harlon Dalton, Storytelling on Its Own Terms, in LAW'S STORIES 57 (Peter Brooks
& Paul Gewirtz eds. 1996) ("When a story is well told, I park my analytic faculties at the
door."); Hyman, supra note 143, at 808-09 ("Critics respond that the narrative format pre
cludes consideration of the critical issues of frequency and typicality, raises difficult issues of
professional discourse, and may even represent the rejection of rationality.").
148. Hyman, supra note 143, at 801.
149. See Hyman, supra note 143, at 801-02 ("Independent of the recent boom in narra
tive scholarship, lawyers are by training and inclination enthusiastic about anecdotal evi
dence."); Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989) (arguing that lawyers are more comfortable
with words than numbers, with stories than statistical studies).
150. In fact, the available evidence is that the defendants in the anecdotes are not typi
cal of the great number of defendants who are subjected to interrogation and who give con
fessions. The false confessors in the anecdotes appear to include a much larger percentage of
juveniles and mentally impaired persons than is typical of criminal defendants in general. See
Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 584; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Nar
ratology, 64 U . CHI. L. REV. 737, 742 (1997) ("The significance of a story of oppression de
pends on its representativeness . . . [T]o evaluate policies for dealing with the ugliness we
must know its frequency, a question that is in the domain of social science rather than of nar
rative.").
151. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1140.
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would impose substantial costs on society, in terms of lost true confes
sions, it is vitally important to know just how many false confessions
will be avoided by the measures sought.
Although the use of deception is not a risk-free procedure, the
magnitude of the risk must be considered before new limits are im
posed. There is no doubt that the conviction of an innocent person be
cause of a false confession is a great miscarriage of justice and a matter
of enormous concern. The research presented to date does not estab
lish that false confessions occur with such frequency that drastic meas
ures are warranted. Commentators have highlighted only a few dozen
false confession cases out of the pool of thousands, if not millions, of
cases in this century in which a person made a confession and was
convicted.152
b. Statistically Valid Research on False Confessions Could Be
Conducted. Commentators urging limits on interrogation techniques
seem reluctant to conduct the kind of research necessary to justify
these limits. For example, while presenting the false confession prob
lem as significant, Professors Leo and Ofshe assert "that it is presently
not possible to quantify the number and frequency of false confessions
or the rate at which they lead to miscarriage of justice . . . . "153 Al
though they correctly concede that such research has not been con
ducted, their assertion that such research is "impossible" is not
sound.154
They assert that there "are at least three reasons why at present it
is not possible to devise an empirical study to measure, quantify or es
timate with any reasonable degree of certainty the incidence of police
induced false confessions or the number of wrongful convictions they
cause."155 They explain, first, that "American police typically do not
record interrogations in their entirety."156 This fact does not present an
insurmountable barrier to researching the frequency of false confes
sions. Currently, two states and many other individual municipalities
videotape confessions.157 Moreover, a researcher could arrange to ob152. See Cassell, supra note 7, at 1127 ("Even looking solely to the last ten years [1987
to 1997], police officers around the country interrogated approximately 23 million suspects
for index crimes." (citing FBI statistics on the number of arrests and assuming approximately
�
80% of arrestees are questioned)).
153. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1135.
154. Other commentators have also asserted that it is "impossible" to measure how of
ten false confessions occur. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, supra note 107, at 85. ("It is impossi
ble to determine or even estimate the frequency with which people confess to crimes that
they did not actually commit.").
155. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1136.
156. Id. at 1136.
157. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157-58 (Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994); see also William Geller, Police Videotaping of Suspect
Interrogations and Confessions (Report to the National Institute of Justice, 1992) (reporting
that thousands of police departments use videotaping at least some of the time).
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serve a large sample of interrogations.158 These observed cases could
then be tracked to determine if there is evidence that the confession
was false and it resulted in a wrongful conviction.
The second objection to researching the frequency of false confes
sions is that "because no criminal justice agency keeps records or col
lects statistics on the number or frequency of interrogations in
America, no one knows how often suspects are interrogated or how
often they confess, whether truthfully or falsely."159 Even assuming
that no such total number of confessions for the nation is readily
available, the absence of such a number does not impede the research.
Random samples could be observed in several representative areas
such as large urban, suburban, and rural police departments.160
The third reason offered for the absence of research on the fre
quency of false confessions is that "many cases of false confession are
likely to go unreported and therefore unacknowledged and unno
ticed" because "most confessors will be arrested, charged, prosecuted
and/or convicted."161 The fact of conviction is certainly strong evidence
that the confession was not false. But if there is other evidence that,
despite the conviction, the confession was false, it is the admittedly dif
ficult job of the researcher to find that evidence.162
158. In fact, Professor Leo has already relied on this approach by observing a sample,
although not an entirely random one, of 182 cases in one jurisdiction. Professor Cassell un
dertook a similar observational study. He, or his research colleague, observed 173 cases in
Salt Lake City. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 101.
159. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 137.
160. In two studies that did not specifically look for false confessions, but that did ex
amine samples of confession cases, the researchers did not report that any of the confessions
were false. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 529 (discussing
Professor Leo's study of 1 82 interrogations in the San Francisco Bay area, and Professor
Cassell's study of 173 interrogations in Salt Lake City).
A random sample survey of the actual number of confessions could be made an even
more manageable project if only murder cases were examined. Limiting the research to
murder cases makes sense because most of the anecdotal evidence on false confessions in
volves homicide cases. See Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 140.

1 61. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1 1 37.
1 62. Professors Bedau and Radelet seem unwilling to acknowledge that better, more
comprehensive research could be conducted and is necessary to support their argument
about wrongful convictions. They claim that if their existing study "fails to convince the
reader of the fallibility of human judgment then nothing will." Bedau & Radelet, supra note
1 12, at 24 (quoting G. SCOTI, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 262 (1 950)). Of
course, no one doubted, even before their study, that some wrongful convictions do occur.
The key question, and the one on which Professors Bedau and Radelet shed little light, is not
whether they occur but how often they occur.
Professors Bedau and Radelet argue that they have already undertaken "a sustained and
systematic attempt to identify as many cases as possible" of wrongful convictions. Id. at 27.
There is no doubt that quite a bit work went into their study. Yet the glaring flaw in their
research is that they did not conduct any kind of random survey. They chose their 350 cases
from the entire body of cases decided this century throughout the country. A far more useful
study would concentrate on a much smaller time frame and geographic area and attempt to
identify the total number of wrongful convictions in that time and place. This would allow
researchers to have some reasonable estimate of the percentage of wrongful convictions.
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The Cost of Limiting Deception

The argument for broad limits on the use of deception should be
evaluated only after considering the costs of imposing such limits. If
such limits were imposed, true confessions would be lost either be
cause officers complying with the restrictive limits would fail to elicit a
confession, or because a confession would be suppressed if officers
questioned a suspect in violation of the limits. Although the precise
cost from losing true confessions cannot be specified, there is no doubt
that it would be substantial. Given that there is no proof of an unac
ceptably high rate or number of false confessions, there is no basis for
imposing on society the large cost of lost true confessions in order to
avoid the much smaller cost of false confessions.
The loss of true confessions, which translates into lost convictions,
imposes substantial costs on both existing and potential victims. Un
convicted criminals have the opportunity to commit additional crimes.
In fact, a criminal who evades punishment for one crime is even more
likely to commit additional crimes because he avoided being rehabili
tated and did not experience any deterrence effect from conviction,
sentencing, and incarceration. Moreover, in addition to the existing
and future victims of crime, other innocent persons suffer from the
loss of confessions and convictions when they are wrongly charged for
crimes to which the actual wrongdoer has not confessed.163
There would be great costs imposed on the criminal justice system
if improper deception were defined to include anything that tends "to
decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confess
ing."164 That is precisely what an interrogator must do if he expects to
obtain a confession. A suspect who fully comprehends the conse
quence of confessing will generally not give a full and truthful confes
sion to an officer. If suspects were allowed fully to protect their selfThus far, Professors Leo and Ofshe, too, have demonstrated little interest in undertaking
research on the actual number of false confessions. They have asserted that "it is far more
important to study the conditions under which [false confessions] occur, the characteristics
of such cases and why they led to deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice than it is
to attempt to quantify" the number of false confessions. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest,
supra note 95, at 1139. They assert that it may not be "worth the effort and expense" to
quantify the rate of false confessions because "there appears to be widespread agreement
that false confessions and miscarriages of justice occur sufficiently often to warrant the con
cern of legal scholars, jurists, and legislators." Id.
163. See Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 109, at 498 ("[T]ruthful confessions
protect the innocent by helping the criminal justice system separate a guilty suspect from the
possibly innocent ones, while the failure to obtain a truthful confession creates a risk of mis
take."); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1907 ("[G]uilty criminal defendants would benefit
substantially if the law were to prohibit deceptive tactics, while innocents would probably be
harmed by the impairment of the government's ability to sort cases.").
164. Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 669 (citing FRED E. INBAU, ET AL.,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986)). See also supra note 9 for
commentators who have urged a very broad definition of deception.
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interest during interrogation, then much of what successful interroga
tors practice, "from insincere politeness to overt trickery, would have
to be disallowed."165 As few suspects spontaneously give full and truth
ful confessions, many confessions, and thus many convictions, would
be lost if all deception were prohibited.

3.

The Value of Deception Outweighs Its Costs

As shown above, no one has made a credible case that there is
truly a substantial number of cases in which persons have been
wrongly convicted based on false confessions induced by deceptive in
terrogation techniques. On the other hand, the substantial value of de
ception in obtaining confessions is based on long experience.166 Given
the limited proof of the false confession problem, there is little ques
tion that the benefit of deception outweighs its costs. Nevertheless,
some commentators urge drastic limits on interrogation.
There are at least three possible explanations why some commen
tators urge drastic limits on deceptive interrogation techniques on the
basis of such limited evidence of false confessions. First, some com
mentators may believe that the few cases they discovered are some
how only the tip of the iceberg. Second, and more likely, these com
mentators may believe that even a very small number of cases of false
confessions is too high a price to pay for the continued use of decep
tion. In reaching this conclusion, these commentators either fail to ap
preciate or substantially undervalue the costs that would be imposed
on society by drastically limiting deception. Third, the commentators
who focus on the few documented cases of innocent persons convicted
because of police-induced false confessions may also be interested in
reducing the far greater number of confessions obtained from guilty
persons. The absence of a confession will sometimes mean that there
will be no conviction or that the case will be so much weaker that the
guilty defendant will be offered a plea bargain and allowed to serve
less time. There is a range of reasons why some commentators may
prefer to have even guilty persons either not be convicted or serve less
time. For example, they may believe that criminal penalties are gener
ally too harsh, that prisons are overcrowded and violent, or that many

165. Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 670. Academic critics of deception tend to
ignore or downplay the enormous value in permitting deception during interrogation. See
Grano, Criminal Procedure, supra note 56, at 714 ("When commentators make reference to
crime control, they usually use such narrow terms as 'the police interest' or 'law enforcement
goals.' Unlike the discussion of perceived police abuse, in which passion abounds, the pass
ing references to the possibility of uncaught murderers and rapists are flat. It is the police
rather than the criminals who are treated as aliens." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caplan,
supra note 58, at 1425 n.47 (1985))).
166. That is why defendants routinely and strenuously object, in motions to suppress
and at trial, to the use of deception during interrogation.
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guilty defendants turned to crime as a consequence of an underprivi
leged upbringing, drug or alcohol use, or after difficult life experi
ences. But placing limits on the use of deception, and thus reducing
the number of convictions of guilty persons, is not the appropriate
means of addressing these other valid concerns about how best to treat
persons who are convicted of a crime.
4.

No Reason to Single Out Deception Out from Other Causes of
Wrongful Conviction

The existing research has documented only a very small number of
convictions caused by false confessions from police deception. Even if
additional studies were to show more such cases, the very broad limi
tations on interrogation would still not necessarily be warranted. In
terrogation, like many other investigative tools in the criminal justice
process, has the potential to result in some number of erroneous con
victions. The argument has not been persuasively made, however, that
interrogation should be singled out from other practices that also have
the potential to cause erroneous convictions.
False confessions appear to be one of the least common reasons
for an erroneous conviction. In fact, there is virtually universal agree
ment that misidentifications by victims and eyewitnesses cause far
more erroneous convictions than do false confessions.167 Yet there are
few limits on the ability of eyewitnesses to testify against a defendant.
Procedures such as showups, lineups, and photo arrays all sometimes
result in misidentifications and erroneous convictions. Although these
procedures cannot be so suggestive as to make a identifications unreli
able,168 the procedures that are permitted still result in some misidenti
fications. These procedures are permitted, however, because they are
167. Misidentification by witnesses was recognized as the "major source" of false con
victions in Borchard's classic work. BORCHARD, supra note 9, at xiii; see also EDWARD
CONNORS ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 24 (1996) (stating that eyewitness misidentification is the main
reason for false convictions); Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages ofJustice and the Constitution,
2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 642 (1 999) ("The major reasons [for false convictions], in order
of importance, are inaccurate identifications, official misconduct, and ineffective defense
counsel."); id. at 656 ("Erroneous identification evidence remains the single leading cause of
false convictions."); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do
We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1347 (noting studies showing
that eyewitness misidentification is the primary source of false convictions); Gross, supra
note 124, at 396 ("[A]s far as anyone can tell, eyewitness misidentification is by far the most
frequent cause of erroneous convictions.").
168. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 1 1 1-12 (1976) ("[T]he Court's concern with
the problem of eyewitness identification" was the "driving force" behind United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293 (1967)); see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1973) (stating that courts
must determine if an identification procedure is so suggestive that it raises "a very substan
tial likelihood of irreparable misidentification").
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recognized as necessary if crimes are to be solved, and wrongdoers
prosecuted.
V. THE LIMITING P RINCIPLES BEYOND RELIABILITY ARE NA R ROW
Although reliability is the primary basis for setting limits on inter
rogation, there are additional reasons for setting some limits. But
these additional reasons are few. Some of the additional reasons of
fered by commentators simply collapse down to the reliability ration
ale. For example, much of the objection to inappropriate "police
methods" is best understood as an objection to methods with an unac
ceptably high risk of causing a false confession.169 There may, however,
be a small number of interrogation techniques that would violate due
process without implicating reliability concerns. Professor Grano sug
gested one such situation with a hypothetical concerning the use of a
police officer who impersonates a chaplain to obtain a confession in
the interrogation roomY0 Arguably, such a deception should be
barred because it intrudes on society's fundamental value in religion.171
The Court has suggested that a "shock the conscience" standard
may be useful for determining when police deception during interro
gation goes too far. The Court applied the shock the conscience stan
dard when it considered police deception not towards a suspect, but
towards the attorney for the suspect who was interrogated. In 1986, in
Moran v. Burbine, the Court heard a claim that the police violated due
process: 1 ) by failing to inform the defendant that an attorney, re
tained by his sister, was trying to contact him; and, 2) by falsely telling
the attorney that the suspect would not be questioned that day. The
Court rejected the claim, finding that "egregious . . . police deception
might rise to a level of a due process violation,"172 but that the conduct
in Moran "falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks sensi
bilities of civilized society as to" violate due process.173
Under a shock the conscience standard, techniques cannot be con
sidered shocking simply because they are successful in convincing sus
pects to give truthful confessions. The shock the conscience standard
bars only those few techniques that, even though they do not involve

169. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof Inmate, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883,
909-12 (1997).
170. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 109; Grano, Selling the Idea, supra
note 8, at 681. The hypothetical of an officer impersonating a priest was originally offered by
Professor Kamisar to show that some police methods must be barred even if the resulting
confession would be reliable. See Kamisar, supra note 54, at 747.
171. Moreover, even if the particular jurisdiction does not provide a priest-penitent
privilege, the suspect may believe that such a privilege exists.
1 72. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1986).
1 73. Id. at 433-34.
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the physical coercion clearly forbidden under the voluntariness test,
and even though they do not implicate the concerns of the reliability
rationale, nevertheless violate "canons fundamental to the 'traditions
and conscience of our people.' "174 Although the hypothetical involv
ing the imposter chaplain is not the only technique that shocks the
conscience by violating a fundamental value, it is one of only a small
group:11s
VI.

CONCLUSION: ADDITIONAL L IMITS ON DECEPTION
ARE UNWARRANTED

Interrogation techniques have changed little in the years since the
Miranda Court itemized them, cast a disapproving look, but concluded
that they were permissible as long as a valid waiver ·of rights was ob
tained. The Dickerson Court affirmed the balance struck in Miranda,
in which rights, warnings, and waivers protect suspects. But Miranda
left (and Dickerson continues to leave) interrogators with a wide berth
for obtaining truthful confessions. A compelling argument has not yet
been made that drastic limits on the use of deceptive interrogation
techniques are either required or advisable. The non-reliability ration
ales for such limits - such as equality, trust, and dignity - largely re
flect the inappropriate view that certain interrogation techniques
should be barred because they are too effective in ·obtaining confes
sions. In fact, there is nothing wrong with obtaining a truthful confes
sion of wrongdoing from a guilty person.
Reliability, however, is an appropriate concern. Interrogation
techniques must be limited when they endanger reliability by creating
a likelihood of producing a false confession. In advocating limits on
deceptive techniques, however, some commentators have overstated
the false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting inter
rogation. The alarming claims of a widespread false confession prob
lem have not yet been demonstrated with a statistically valid sample of
confession cases. Thus far, the evidence of the false confession prob
lem consists only of anecdotal reports. On the other hand, broad limits
on deception could result in the loss of many thousands of confessions
by guilty persons. Because there is insufficient proof of the scope of
the false confession problem, the reliability rationale does not provide
a basis, at least yet, for barring or greatly limiting deception during in
terrogation.

174. Moran, 475 U.S. at 432 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
175. If barring an officer from impersonating a chaplain is appropriate, should an officer
also be barred from impersonating a physician? Beyond clearly fundamental values such as
religion, it is far less clear which interests are so important outside of the interrogation room
that they should not be impinged on by interrogation techniques.
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Moreover, even if researchers provide additional empirical proof
on the false confession problem, alternatives to drastic prohibitions on
interrogation techniques should be considered. For example, there is
widespread agreement among commentators that interrogations
should be videotaped. At least some of the concerns raised about false
confessions could be addressed by the use of videotaping, rather than
by strictly limiting interrogation techniques.176
There is no question that deceptive interrogation techniques can
contribute to the unpleasantness that suspects, both guilty and inno
cent, endure during interrogation. Nevertheless, once there is prob
able cause to suspect a person of a crime, some level of discomfort is
considered acceptable because of society's interest in investigating and
solving crimes. Deceptive but nonthreatening interrogation will gen
erally be no more unpleasant than the other intrusions deemed rea
sonable after a showing of probable cause - such as having one's
home thoroughly searched pursuant to a warrant, or being placed in a
detention facility during post-arrest processing.177 The probable cause
standard provides an appropriate threshold of protection from both
the pressures of custodial interrogation and the unpleasantness of de
ceptive interrogation techniques.
There is a growing view that reliability is the appropriate focus of
the debate over the use of deceptive interrogation techniques. There
should also be a greater acknowledgement that, before these tech
niques are drastically limited, there must be statistically sound, empiri
cal research to determine if there truly is a widespread problem with
police-induced false confessions. In the meantime, we should let the
police do their job of investigating crime, but we should also be alert
to the possibility of that tragic case in which an innocent person has
been wrongly convicted because of a police-induced false confession.

176. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 494 ("The risk of harm caused by
false confessions could be greatly reduced if police were required to video- or audio-record
the entirety of their interrogations."). For additional support of videotaping, see Cassell,
Social Costs, supra note 101, at 486-97; KAMISAR, supra note 31, at 132-36; Yale Kamisar,
Foreword: Brewer v. Williams
A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209,
236-43 (1977). Even when there is no videotape, defendants may be able to raise the false
confession concern with the use of expert psychological witnesses. At this time, however, the
false confession research is not sufficiently developed for witnesses on false confessions to
qualify as experts under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. , 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
" [A)dmissions of expert testimony based on this new theory is premature" largely because
"the empirical base that supports the theory has too many unanswered questions . . . " See
James R. Agar, II, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony, 1999 Aug.
Army Law 26, 42 (1999) (explaining that two federal appellate courts have admitted such
evidence while the thirteen state courts that have ruled are divided on the issue). Scientific
advances in DNA and other areas, however, do provide an additional measure of protection
against wrongful convictions.
-

.

177. See Caplan, supra note 58, at 1468 (comparing due process to the Fourth
Amendment which was understood as forbidding only "unreasonable" invasions of privacy).

